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In Search of Paternal Equity:
A Father's Right to Pursue a Claim
of Misrepresentation of Fertility
Jill E. Evans*
There are words that echo through the judicial and social construct of
every society. Words such as "choice," "equality," "morality," and
"balance" are stated with such certainty of meaning that the fact of their
generational interpretation is lost and corresponding results are skewed.
The search for a father's rights in pursuing a claim for misrepresentation
of fertility intersects with each of these concepts and emerges burdened
not only by this certainty but also obfuscated in a well-meaning fog of
judicial interpretation. In part, this obfuscation is attributable to the
conflicts and emotions attendant to the controversy over abortion rights
and the moral uncertainty surrounding the inception of life and the point
at which moral definitions intersect with legal rights.1 The debate has
Professor, Samford University Cumberland School of Law.
1. Roe v. Wade and its progeny reflect an effort by the Supreme Court to balance state
legislation of morality, premised on life beginning at conception, against individual liberty,
emerging from challenges to state actions viewed as inhibiting or otherwise interfering with this
liberty interest. Michael J. Perry, What is 'Morality' Anyway?, 45 VILL. L. REv. 69, 70 (2000).
Perry asserts:
Moral controversy is often at the center of legal controversy; in particular, controversy
about whether one or another practice (abortion, homosexual sexual conduct,
physician-assisted suicide, etc.) is, at least in some instances, morally permissible is
often at the center of controversy about whether the practice should be, at least in some
instances, legally permissible.
Perry, supra, at 70; see Stefanie Lee Black, Comment, Competing Interests in the Fetus: A Look
into PaternalRights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 987, 988-89
(1993) (commenting that the debate over abortion rights stems from epistemological bases upon
which each side constructs its belief with the position of pro-lifers in natural law under which
abortion is ethically unconscionable).
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall
disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
pregnancy, even in its earliest stages. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive
to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The
underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic
questions ....
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
*
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centered on the right of pregnant women, vis-?t-vis all other interests, to
terminate their pregnancies with impunity, 2 with lawyers and
academicians exploring virtually every aspect of the abortion debate on
moral, legal and feminist grounds. 3 Indeed, the tension between the

right of a pregnant woman to abort a fetus and the rights-if any-of
the state, the unborn fetus, or even the father has become an intellectual
cul-de-sac and has served to reshape the law governing both privacy and

procreation.
This Article seeks at least one exit to this intellectual penumbra by
expanding on the existing body of scholarship examining paternal rights
as they exist in the shadow of Roe v. Wade and its progeny. 4 While this

Article necessarily navigates its way through some of the discussion on
abortion rights, it expresses no view on the merits of the controversy
itself but rather seeks simply to identify the resultant balance accorded
2. See generally, Wendy C. Shapero, Does A Nonviable Fetus's Right to Bring A Wrongful
Death Action Endanger a Woman's Right to Choose?, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 325 (1999) (opposing
expansion of fetal rights to the extent it impacts women's reproductive choices). Recent
scholarship has questioned whether the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a fetus as a
"person" can be reconciled with the expansion of state wrongful death actions to include an
unborn fetus, both viable and, in some states, nonviable. Id.
3. Scholarship critical of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Roe and related decisions is legion.
See Christina L. Misner, What if Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion Instead? The Effect of Davis v.
Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 265 (1995) (analyzing the lesser
scrutiny courts can use to review state laws restricting abortion as a result of Roe v. Wade); Krista
L. Newkirk, State-CompelledFetal Surgery: The Viability Test Is Not Viable, 4 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 467 (1998) (discussing how Roe has been used by both those arguing for women's
rights and those arguing for fetal rights); Rosamund Scott, The Pregnant Woman and the Good
Samaritan, Can a Woman Have a Duty to Undergo a Caesarean Section?, 20 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUDIES 407 (2000) (discussing the abortion issue under English law); Shapero, supra note 2
(claiming that because Roe did not create new rights for the fetus, it cannot be used to apply a
new nonviability standard); Mary A. Totz, Comment, What's Goodfor the Goose is Goodfor the
Gander: Toward Recognition of Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141 (1994)
(arguing that the child-rearing burden no longer falls entirely on a woman, as it did in Roe, so Roe
should not apply to paternal rights cases).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (invalidating a
provision requiring husband notification as constituting an undue burden on women); S. Dresden
Brunner, Cultural Feminism: It Sounds Good, But Will it Work? Application to a Husband's
Interest in His Wife's Abortion Decision, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 101 (1996) (arguing that a
woman in a nonabusive marriage should allow her husband a say in the abortion decision); Molly
Diggins, PaternalInterests in the Abortion Decision: Does the FatherHave a Say?, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 377 (1989) (proposing a statute that would take into account the father's interest prior
to a woman obtaining an abortion); Michael L. Jackson, Fatherhoodand the Law: Reproductive
Rights and Responsibilities of Men, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 53 (1999) (analyzing whether the
disparity in treatment of the reproductive liberty of men and women is justified and proposing a
more equal approach); Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative Father's Right to
Terminate His Interests In and Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1998)
(presenting a model statute for a father to voluntarily terminate his rights and obligations to his
child); Erika M. Hiester, Note, Child Support Statutes and the Father'sRight Not to Procreate,2
AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 218-20 (2004) (discussing laws regarding parental obligations).
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parental interests in light of the dictates of the Roe decision and the
cases that have followed. In so doing, this Article focuses specifically

on the ability of a putative father to seek damages in tort for a woman's
misrepresentations as to fertility or contraceptive use in the event she
chooses not to abort, and carries the child to term. 5 To date, efforts by

deceived fathers to seek redress for misrepresentations of fertility by the
mother have been soundly rejected even though the repercussions of
6
such conduct are substantial. Both case and statutory law effectively

hold a putative father strictly liable should sexual intercourse result in
the birth of a child.7 Child support obligations attach immediately upon
birth, without regard to whether fatherhood was desired or conception
occurred through the mother's deceit as to her fertility or use of birth
control. Intuitively, the balance between the outrage of the father and
the needs of the child compel denial of relief as a matter of policy
despite what would otherwise seem to be actionable fraud. Despite

arguments by some commentators that a claim for misrepresentation of
fertility is no different than other claims sounding in tort and therefore
should be allowed, 9 this Article contends that refusal to accord relief is
appropriate and warranted by overriding public policy concerns. At the
same time, the Article suggests that the articulated rationales underlying
judicial denial of relief have been inconsistent and lack coherence,

permitting

differential

treatment

in

certain

cases

where

the

5. These claims have been presented both as defenses to actions for child support as well as in
separate actions for breach of contract, emotional distress, negligence and fraud. See generally J.
Terrell Mann, Misrepresentationof Sterility or of Use of Birth Control, 26 J. FAM. L. 623 (1987-

88) (discussing battery, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty).
6. Damages have been available in some circumstances where the deceived party is the
mother. See generally Judith R. Taber, Note, Zehr v. Haugen and Wrongful Pregnancy:
Extending the Rationale to Deceihful Pregnancy Claims, 74 OR. L. REV. 405 (1995) (noting

difference in treatment between maternal and paternal claims for deceit and arguing that the
differentiation is appropriate).
7. Decisions such as Roe and its progeny, although permitting a pregnant woman to avoid the
consequences of intercourse, extend no correlative right to the man, but rather permit the woman
to unilaterally determine whether a man will or will not become a father. See infra Part IV
(detailing the disparity in the rights of men and women in the decision to abort a fetus).
8. Claims for misrepresentation of fertility are not limited to fraud, but can include theories of
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and even contract. This Article focuses
generally on the tort of fraud or deceit, although the substance of the analysis and conclusion
apply to related claims.
9. See, e.g., Paula C. Murray & Brenda J. Winslet, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy and
Emerging Tort Liability for Deceit in Interpersonal Relationships, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 779

(1986) (arguing that public policy should not completely bar recovery for misrepresentations of
fertility and courts should look at each case on an ad hoc basis to insure the interests of the child
are protected); see also Sarah E. Rudolph, Inequities in the Current Judicial Analysis of
Misrepresentation of Fertility Claims, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331 (1989) (arguing that the

misrepresenting party should have primary liability for the support obligation).
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misrepresentation of fertility claim is brought by the deceived mother.
Part I begins by briefly addressing the evolution of the right to
privacy in procreative decisions that culminated in Roe and its progeny
and the current inequity in treatment between putative fathers and
pregnant women. 10 Part II then discusses the implications of fatherhood
from a socioeconomic perspective. 1' In Part III, this Article looks at the
judicial treatment of claims for misrepresentation of fertility and the
various policy arguments advanced by the courts to support the denial
of redress for paternal claims. 12 The discussion considers some of the
inconsistencies inherent in these policies either as applied or as
articulated, and notes the difference in treatment accorded to identical
claims brought by the mother. Part IV suggests that the courts have
extended a de facto immunity to a pregnant woman that effectively
insulates her from liability to the father even for conduct unrelated to
her decision to or not to abort a fetus and notes that the father enjoys no
similar immunity from claims by the mother. 13 In Part V, this Article
contends that the refusal to grant relief is firmly entrenched in the
protective polices that surround procreation and, when viewed within
the framework of procreative rights, can easily be reconciled with
traditional theories of tort law and justice. 14 Accordingly, this Article
concludes
that neither maternal nor paternal claims for
misrepresentation of fertility should constitute a legal wrong entitled to
protection in tort, regardless of the nature of the damages alleged.

I.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE EROSION OF PATERNAL INTEREST

The substantive due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment
has been held to encompass a right to liberty that includes "a right of
15
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy."'
10.
11.
12.
13.

See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

I (discussing the right to privacy in the wake of Roe v. Wade).
II (analyzing the socioeconomic impacts of fatherhood).
III (examining recent jurisprudence in misrepresentation-of-fertility claims).
IV (discussing the disparity between rights enjoyed by the mother and father

in a decision to abort a fetus).
14. See infra Part V (arguing that the rights granted to women in procreation can be reconciled

with traditional theories of justice).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992) (mentioning that the Due Process Clause "has been understood to contain a
substantive component as well, on 'barrring certain government actions regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them'); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684
(1977) (quoting the above-cited language from the Roe decision); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937) (stating that this is a right that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
entitled to protection); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[A]I fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the federal
Constitution from invasion by the States."). Early privacy rights were discussed in the context of
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The penumbra of personal rights protected under the umbrella of the
Fourteenth Amendment is neither explicitly articulated in the
Constitution, nor have its "outer limits" been marked. 16 However, the
Supreme Court has found certain privacy rights to be "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,"' 17 and it is against this standard that asserted privacy
rights are measured and state8 actions seeking to interfere with their
expression strictly construed.'
the Fourth Amendment. For example, Justice Douglas, in an early effort to describe the breadth
of privacy rights, dissenting in Public Utility Commission v. Pollak, stated:

The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. Part of our claim to
privacy is in the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures. It gives the guarantee that a man's home is his castle beyond invasion
either by inquisitive or by officious people. A man loses that privacy of course when
he goes upon the streets or enters public places. But even in his activities outside the
home he has immunities from controls bearing on privacy. He may not be compelled
against his will to attend a religious service; he may not be forced to make an
affirmation or observe a ritual that violates his scruples; he may not be made to accept
one religious, political or philosophical creed as against another.
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834. In his Roe v. Wade opinion, Justice Blackmun sought to define
the basis of the right to privacy, stating:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. [However], the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or
individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First
Amendment ...in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment ...or in the concept of liberty

guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun further noted that Supreme Court
decisions made it clear that the zone of privacy "has some extension to activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child-rearing and education." Id.
at 152-53 (citations omitted).
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105, (1934)); Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying protection to
homosexual activity), overruled by Lawerence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In determining which rights are fundamental, judges...
must look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a
principle is 'so rooted [there] ...as to be ranked as fundamental."'); Palko, 302 U.S. at 325
(noting that these rights include those fundamental liberties "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" whereby liberty and justice would not exist if they were sacrificed).
18. Griswold,381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) for the proposition that "[w]here there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling"); see Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (noting that where regulation touches a fundamental right,
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The Court has been emphatic that such individual liberty interests
include decisions on procreation and child-rearing. 19 Early cases
described the right to procreate as one "fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race, ' ' 20 and as "one of the basic civil
rights of man." 2 1 Both Griswold v. Connecticu2 2 and later Carey v.
states must show compelling interest and the resulting legislation must be narrowly drawn).
Accordingly, in holding that the right to privacy extended to marriage and the family unit, the
Court in Griswoldwrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. The Court has consistently recognized the importance of the integrity
of the institution of marriage and of the family unit as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) ("The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.") (citations omitted)); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 406 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a statute that sought to prevent residents obligated to
provide child support from marrying without court approval); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (noting that
"marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1,
12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (describing the existence of a "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the right "to marry, establish
a home and bring up children" is central to the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (stating that marriage is "the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress").
19. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (finding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a state school-attendance statute); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (striking down a statute requiring parents to send children to public
schools). Similarly, the Court has upheld the right of parents to determine the manner in which
their children will be reared and educated. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 445; Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (finding that parents have an interest in controlling the education and
upbringing of their children); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401; Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
21. Id. In Skinner, the Supreme Court overturned a statute mandating compulsory sterilization
of felons convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude," effectively rejecting its prior decision in Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), which had upheld a similar statute as applied to
institutionalized "imbeciles." Id. at 542-43. "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. The
Court reasoned that the right to procreate was a basic liberty, which once impaired by involuntary
sterilization, was irreparably injured and forever lost: "There is no redemption for the individual
whom the law [mandating sterilization] touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to
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that the scope of

fundamental privacy rights under which procreative autonomy fell

23
And, although Griswold
necessarily included a right not to procreate.
the marital unit, as
afforded
was
protection
constitutional
that
suggested
v. Baird24
Eisenstadt
components,
individual
its
to
opposed

subsequently recognized that the privacy right inherent in procreative
decisions, albeit often raised within the confines of marriage, extended
not just to those within the marital relationship, but to those without it
as well. "If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the

individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as to the

25
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Because this privacy right
inured in the individual, without regard to marital status, the state had
access to or use of contraceptive
no grounds upon which to prohibit
26
devices by unmarried persons.
Until the advent of the abortion debate, privacy rights related to
family and procreation were discussed without regard to gender. Both
the man and the woman were held to have a commensurate right to

his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; see
also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (holding that the right to conceive and raise a
child is "far more precious to appellant than property rights").
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
23. See Carey v. Poulation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (noting that "in a field that
by definition concerns the most intimate of human activities and relationships, decisions whether
to accomplish or to prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive").
24. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
25. Id. at 453; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (finding a
significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (balancing the liberty interest against a state's attempt to compel
an individual to undergo surgery to recover evidence of a crime). Professor Dolgin discussed the
implications of Eisenstadt on social understanding of the family, and indeed Griswold's
representation of the family as a unit, as opposed to individual members, commenting that:
[T]he claim in Eisenstadt is far more startling and far less traditional than that in
Griswold .... In fact, it is revolutionary when applied to the family. Long after the
last vestiges of the feudal order were replaced in the marketplace by notions of free
contract and autonomous individuality, Western society continued to define spousesand, even more particularly, parents and their children-as units of relationship with
reality apart from, and encompassing, that of the individuals involved.
Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1519, 1545 (1994) [hereinafter Dolgin, Family in Transition]. Professor Dolgin asserts that
Eisenstadtreflected constitutional acceptance of "momentous" changes in the societal view of the
family into one more aligned with traditional market relations. Id. at 1553-54.
26. "The liberty acknowledged in Eisenstadt has been coined 'reproductive autonomy.' This
term adopts the notion that the intimacy and gravity of contraceptive decisions are not lessened
by the absence of marriage; individuals make up the reproductive act." Black, supra note 1, at
997.
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procreate. 27 With the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,
however, the procreative rights of the woman gained ascendancy over
the rights of the man, effectively curtailing, if not eliminating the man's
"procreative autonomy. ' 2 8 Roe established that the breadth of
a
woman's fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy should she choose to do so. 29 The linchpin of
the Roe decision, reaffirmed twenty years later in Planned Parenthood

v. Casey,30 was the Court's determination that the fetus's "viability"
serves as the demarcation line between a woman's right to choose to
abort a pregnancy
and the state's right to prohibit or otherwise regulate
31
abortion.
27. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rationalizing liberty interests of
parents and children with respect to the family unit and without focusing on procreation rights of
a specific gender, but rather the family unit as a whole); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(applying the equal protection clause to hold that men and women, regardless of race, have the
right to marry, and procreate, with whomever they choose); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding a law, which mandated sterilization for habitual
criminals, to be unconstitutional and that each individual has the right to procreate).
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973); see also Jackson, supra note 4, at 53
(discussing inequalities in parental rights of women and men).
29. This constitutional right to abortion was deemed to be a liberty interest inherent in the
individual and accordingly protected against state interference. Such protection was not
unlimited. The Court in Roe v. Wade also held that the fetus was a separate entity from the
pregnant woman. As a result, simply by virtue of being pregnant a woman necessarily "[cannot]
be isolated in her privacy ...".Roe,410 U.S. at 159. Accordingly, the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting the "potentiality" of life, and the woman's right to privacy was to be
"measured accordingly." Id. at 164. At the time of Roe, the standard of measurement set by the
Supreme Court was the end of the second trimester. The state could not impede a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy during the first or second trimester, although in the interests
of protecting maternal health, the state could regulate the abortion procedure during the second
trimester. Once viability was reached, the state could prohibit abortion with limited exception.
Id. at 164-65.
30. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. Roe's trimester approach lasted until the Supreme Court decision
in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey. Id. at 870-73. Although several previous cases seemed to
erode the purportedly unfettered right to abortion established in Roe, it was not until the Casey
decision that the Court rejected the rigid trimester approach in favor of a "viability" approach. Id.
Casey permitted the state to protect fetal interests at any point during the pregnancy, and further
permitted the state to prohibit abortion at the point of viability. Id. Recognizing the impact of
advances in neonatal care had advanced the point of viability since the Roe decision, the Court
stated "these facts go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests,
and ... have no bearing on the validity of Roe's central holding, that viability marks the earliest
point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions." Id. at 860. More significant however, is the query whether
advances in reproductive and prenatal technology render the Court's persistent adherence to an
artificial definition of "person" logically supportable. But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (rejecting the
argument that the Constitution protected a previable fetus and finding the fetus was not a person
until that point). Inherent in this inquiry is the workability of the Court's benchmark of viability.
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As a consequence, despite dicta by the Court in some of the early
privacy decisions suggesting equality between parents, Roe dispelled
any illusions that procreative rights were gender-neutral.3 2 Subsequent
decisions simply affirmed this prioritization of women's rights. 33 The

Court continued to reject arguments seeking to advance paternal rights
or interests in the fetus, adhering to its admonition that no obstacle be
placed in the path of a woman's right to choose. 34 In deciding Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, three years following Roe, the Court
specifically addressed the issue of paternal rights in a case challenging a
Missouri statute that required a married woman to obtain spousal

consent prior to an abortion. 35 In response to the state's contention that
the spousal consent requirement was designed to insure that "any major

change in family status [of a marriage] is a decision to be made jointly
by the marriage partners," 36 Justice Blackmun, although acknowledging
the importance of the marital relationship, found that the statute gave
sought to
the spouse a unilateral right to veto an abortion and thereby
37
directly.
do
not
could
it
what
delegation
by
accomplish

See, e.g., Alec Walen, Consensual Sex Without Assuming the Risk of Carrying an Unwanted
Fetus: Another Foundationfor the Right to an Abortion, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1997)

(criticizing Roe and stating "[s]ince a woman's right is linked to viability it will surely be eroded
as technology improves"). Walen comments that viability eventually could exist at conception,
but maintenance outside the womb would be economically infeasible. Id. at 1055.
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (1973).
33. More commonly referred to as a woman's right to choose, the core of the inquiry in each
case has turned on the determination of whether, and when, a professed state interest becomes
compelling enough to override privacy interests deemed inherent in the substantive rights
accorded under the due process clause. Indeed, Roe v. Wade involved a challenge by an unwed
pregnant woman to a Texas statute criminalizing abortion unless the pregnancy endangered the
mother's life.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18.

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth addressed the

constitutionality of a Missouri statute requiring spousal consent prior to an abortion and Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey invalidated Pennsylvania's mandatory statutory spousal notification of a
woman's pregnancy prior to abortion as presenting a "substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion." The Supreme Court in Casey held that such a provision would be
"tantamount to the veto found unconstitutional in Danforth." Casey, 505 U.S. at 897. Thus, while
prior to viability a state may not interfere with a woman's right to choose to abort a fetus, the
state may nonetheless ensure that the choice is informed and further take measures to "persuade
the woman to choose childbirth over abortion." Id. at 878. The inquiry is whether the methods
chosen by the state hinder or obstruct the fundamental right of the woman to choose to abort or
otherwise restrict access to abortion. However, once the fetus is deemed viable, the state "may go
so far as to proscribe abortion during that period except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163--64.
34. Roe v. Wade, although acknowledging the existence of a paternal interest, expressly
reserved the question of a father's rights in the context of abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165, n.67.
35. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1976).
36. Id. at 68.
37. Id. at 69-70. Yet, in invalidating the spousal consent provision, Danforthdid not hold that
any protection of paternal interests would be unconstitutional. The focus of the decision was on
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By its terms, Danforth addressed the issue of paternal rights within
the context of a spousal consent provision. The Court was confronted
with balancing the right of a woman to choose to abort against the right
of the spouse to unilaterally veto that decision. 3 8
The Court
acknowledged that Roe, read together with its concurrent decision in
Doe v. Bolton, effectively afforded a woman the unilateral right to
terminate even against the father's wishes. 39 Regardless, the Court had
little difficulty concluding that the balance, and therefore ultimate
decision-making ower as to whether to abort, should rest exclusively
with the woman, expounding that it is "[she] who physically bears the
child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy, as between the two ...,, 4 1 Subsequent Supreme Court

decisions reaffirmed that any provisions requiring absolute spousal
consent were precluded by Danforth.42
The Court finally addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring
only spousal notification, but not consent, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.43 Casey was premised in part on the idea that the old common

law view of marriage, with a woman holding an inferior position bereft
of legal right or status, was no longer consonant with Roe and its

progeny.4 The Court reiterated its rejection of presumptions explicit in
the state's determination "that the husband's interest in continuing the pregnancy of his wife
always outweighs any interest on her part in terminating it irrespective of the condition of their
marriage." Id. at 70, n. 11. Such a balance did not simply impair a woman's right to choose, but
placed an insurmountable, and therefore unconstitutional, obstacle in her path.
38.

Id. at 69-72.

39. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
40. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
41.

Id.

42. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 448-55 (1983)
(using the Court's reasoning in Danforth to find that a mandatory waiting period does not further
any legitimate state interest); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (recognizing that a
woman is protected from requirements that interfere with her freedom of choice); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) (reiterating the Danforth decision).
43. In holding that it was not constitutional, the Court distinguished its decisions in Bellotti v.
Baird, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and Danforth which all upheld parental

notice and consent provisions:
Those enactments, and our judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the quite
reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents and
that children will often not realize that their parents have their best interests at heart.
We cannot adopt a parallel assumption about adult women.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
44. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897. The Court cited the 1873 decision of Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
130 (1873), where "three Members of this Court reaffirmed the common-law principle that "a
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and
representative in the social state... " Id. at 896-97. The Court then noted that as recently as
1961, the law still did not afford women "full and independent legal status under the
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prior precedent that treated the marital unit simply as an extension of
the man: "[t]hese views, of course, are no longer consistent with our
45 The
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution."
Court acknowledged that the fundamental right to procreate as
delineated in cases such as Casey and Eisenstadt inured to the
individual-not the marital unit-and concluded that requiring spousal
notification, at least as provided by the statute at issue, imposed an
a fetus. 46
undue burden on a woman's individual right to choose to abort
A number of prior Supreme Court cases recognized a man's strong
paternal rights regarding children he has fathered.4 7 However, Casey
clearly differentiated between the rights of the father before and after
childbirth asserting that the father's interest in the unborn and
mother. 48
presumably non-viable child was less than that of the
Although Danforth conceded that paternal interests could be significant,
Casey established that they simply would not outweigh what was
deemed to be the stronger interest of the woman in the integrity and use
of her body.
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.... Her suffering
is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon
its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has

Constitution." Id. at 897 (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
45. Id. See Dolgin, Family in Transition, supra note 25, at 1519 (noting that "the old
inequalitites that defined women and children-as a matter of nature's inevitabilities-as
essentially inferior to men, are being eroded").
46. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 897 (reasoning that the risk of domestic violence might deter
women from seeking an abortion if they were required to notify their spouses, the Court stated
that mandatory spousal notification prior to an abortion would be "tantamount to the veto found
unconstitutional in Danforth"). It was sufficient, in the eyes of the Court, that only a few women
would be deterred for the statutory requirement to be unconstitutional. Id. at 897-98. Again, as
in many of its prior decisions, at issue in Casey was a statute that imposed requirements upon
married women. Id. at 897. Although not specifically addressed by the Casey decision,
presumably, even though clearly the same interests are not at stake, the argument nonetheless
exists that unmarried women are subject to an equal risk from violent boyfriends.
47. See, e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (recognizing that a husband has a "deep and proper
concern and interest ... in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus
she is carrying"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (stating that the father has
"cognizable and substantial" interest in custody of his children); see also, Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (pointing out "the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being
invariably less qualified" than mothers); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978) (finding
the interest of a father in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of his offspring to
be "cognizable and substantial").
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-97; but see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
(affirming a father's right not to procreate where divorcing couple had stored frozen embryos and
no pregnancy had yet occurred).
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been in the course of our history and our culture. 49

Indeed it is only once the child is living, the opinion suggests, that the
interests of the mother and father approached even a semblance of
equality. Thus, Danforth and Casey served to cement the transcendence

of the woman's right to choose, regardless of the acquiescence or
opposition of the man and regardless of the circumstances under which
conception occurred.5 °
Without doubt, the trend reflected by the abortion decisions has its
genesis in part on the reshaping of societal attitudes towards women and
awareness that traditional notions of a woman's role were incompatible
with the Constitution. 5 1 Yet the abortion decisions reflect an approach
consistent with the views of radical feminists and patriarchic
jurisprudence-the idea that a woman has the sole right to decide what
intrusions she is willin to bear upon her body, including the intrusion
created by pregnancy.
Countervailing interests of the state, the fetus,
or the father are subjugated to this interest in bodily integrity, at least
until the point of viability. Within the context of pregnancy, paternal
rights are clearly non-existent. 53 Neither married nor unmarried fathers
have standing to enjoin or otherwise interfere in a woman's decision to

49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; see Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart J., dissenting) ("The mother
carries and bears the child .... ").
50. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 67 (arguing that men and women should be treated more
equally than is allowed under Danforth and Casey); Black, supra note 1, at 998-99 (outlining
judicial decisions culminating in the current elevated status of women's procreative liberty).
51. For an article discussing the need to reevaluate the legal and cultural assumptions
surrounding the male and female role and accompanying limitations on rights, see Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 995 (1984). Interestingly, proponents of
cultural feminism arguably would accord the father a right to participate in the abortion decision
out of a concern for the marital relationship. See Brunner, supra note 4, at 101 (arguing that
within a nonabusive marriage the wife should allow the husband input in the abortion decision);
see also Diggins, supra note 4, at 390 (arguing that "unilateral control over the abortion decision
can operate to destabilize the institution of marriage"). In response to the focus by Casey on the
potential for spousal abuse as a justification for rejecting spousal notification, cultural feminist
theory would differentiate between abusive and non-abusive relationships. Brunner, supra note
4, at 102. In non-abusive relationships, a father would have a legal interest and moral right in the
abortion decision. In reconciling lack of notification in an abusive relationship, feminist theory
would hold that the "woman's individual responsibility to herself to avoid harm outweighs her
obligation to communicate with her husband," again presumably in the interest of maintaining the
marital relationship. Id. "Cultural feminism theorizes that the sense of connection entails a way
of learning, of moral development, a view of the world and one's place in it which sharply
contrasts with men's." Id. at 104.
52. Brunner, supra note 4 at 11. See Scott, supra note 3, at 430 ("It is neither fair nor just
that a person (a woman) be considered to assume obligations which override her rights to selfdetermination and, especially, bodily integrity.").
53. But see Misner, supra note 3 (discussing paternal rights over preembryos and noting that
in the context of preembryos, paternal rights approach equality with maternal rights).
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carry a child to term or to terminate her pregnancy. 54 Notably, this
circumscription of paternal rights has been unaccompanied by a
concomitant restriction in paternal obligations.
II.

THE PATERNAL OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT

Although paternal rights increase with the birth of the child, those
rights are tenuous at best and, in the case of unmarried putative fathers,
often overruled. Historically, paternal rights subsequent to the birth of a
child arose only through the marital relationship and in modern
jurisprudence have not been afforded the same protection as maternal
rights. 5 5 A child born to a married woman was presumed to be the child
father. 56
of the spouse, whether or not the spouse was the biological
The state interest in preserving the stability of marriage and the
54. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d
128, 130 (Mass. 1974); Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977);
Steinhoff v. Steinhoff, 531 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). These were all cases where a
putative father was successful in obtaining an injunction in the lower court that have been
uniformly overturned on appeal. See Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding an injunction prohibiting a wife from getting an abortion due to lack of consent from
husband to be a violation of her constitutional rights); Andrea M. Sharrin, PotentialFathers and
Abortion: A Woman's Womb Is Not A Man's Castle, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1359, 1359 (1990)
(discussing numerous cases brought by fathers to "enjoin pregnant women from obtaining
abortions"). The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Doe v. Doe, decided shortly after Roe v. Wade,
commented:
We are deeply conscious of the husband's interest in the abortion decision, at least
while the parties are living together in harmony. Surely that interest is legitimate.
Surely if family life is to prosper, he should participate with his wife in the decision.
But it does not follow that he must have an absolute veto, or that his veto, reasoned or
unreasoned, can be enforced by the Commonwealth.
Doe, 314 N.E.2d at 564.
55. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle For ParentalEquality, 38
UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991) (discussing historical presumptions accorded maternal role and
accompanying rights and obligations). But see Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial
Assumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993) [hereinafter Dolgin, Just a Gene]
(discussing impact of surrogate cases on concept of the maternal role).
56. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (noting that where child "is born
into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly
unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to
give categorical preference to the latter"); Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Mich.
1991) (finding the putative father of a child born to a married woman had no standing to seek
determination of paternity); In re Paternity of C.A.S., 456 N.W. 2d 899, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)
(ruling putative father could not compel tests to establish paternity where child born to married
woman); see also Editorial, Presumptionof Legitimacy of a Child Born in Wedlock, 33 HARV. L.
REV. 306 (1906) (discussing the basis of the presumption that a child born to a married woman is
a child of her husband). But see Schaffer v. Schaffer, 445 A.2d 589, 590 (Conn. 1982) (allowing
a rebuttable presumption only with clear and convincing "proof that the child is illegitimate");
Tacchi v. Tacchi, 195 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (N.Y App. Div. 1959) (finding, in annulment action
based on fraud and misrepresentation by wife, that husband was not biological father of child
born several months following the marriage and denied motion for support).
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legitimacy of the child was valued over the rights of the natural father
who was denied any relationship with the child at all.5 7 Courts upheld,
as issues of "legislative policy," state statutes carrying presumptions of

parentage for children born within a marriage. 58 In cases where neither

party was married, the rights of a putative father depended less on a

biological connection with the child and more on the depth of the
59

relationship the father maintained with the mother.
In Stanley v. Illinois60 and Quilloin v. Walcott,6 1 the Supreme Court
rejected the extension of rights to a putative father based solely on
biological parentage, instead requiring the father to establish that he had
a relationship with the child as well as the child's mother. Cases such
as Stanley, Quilloin,63 and Caban v. Mohammed,64 followed shortly
57. Kristen Santillo, Disestablishment of Paternity and the Future of Child Support
Obligations, 37 Fam. L.Q. 503, 505 (2003). Santillo writes:
The policy interests undergirding the paternity presumption were: (1) maintaining the
integrity of the family unit; (2) preventing children from being declared illegitimate,
which carried with it severe legal and social consequences under the common law; and
(3) having an individual, rather than the state, assume the financial burden of
supporting the child.
Id.
58. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129-30; Vincent B. v. Joan R., 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 10-11 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981). The California Court of Appeals viewed the presumption that a child born to a
married couple would be deemed the child of the husband as a matter of overriding social policy
to ensure the integrity of the marital relationship and the family unit. Vincent B., 179 Cal. Rptr. at
10. The presumption was rebuttable only where the husband was impotent or sterile, or had not
been cohabiting with the wife. Id. Under those circumstances, the husband would be aware that
the child could not be his. Id. at 11; see also County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797,
800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that biological child born while married woman was separated
from her husband was not entitled to presumption of marital paternity to shield himself from
financial consequences of adulterous affair).
59. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 253 (1995); see also
Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 29, 49 (2003) (discussing the treatment of support obligations for illegitimate
children under the theories of delict and descent, and the subsequent enactment of the "Bastardy
Laws").
60. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
61. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
62. In Stanley, the putative father could show that although unmarried, he and the children's
mother had cohabited for many years and had raised the children as if they were married.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. However, state statute conclusively presumed unwed fathers' lack of
fitness, and, upon the death of the mother, the children were removed from the custody of the
father and became wards of the state. id. at 646-47. The Supreme Court held that in establishing
such a presumption, the statute violated an unwed father's equal protection and due process rights
and that where the father could demonstrate an established relationship with the children, he was
entitled to notice and a particularized hearing on whether he was or was not a "fit" parent for
purposes of retaining custody after the mother's death. Id. at 658-59.
63. In Quilloin, the father could show no established relationship either with the mother or the
child, who lived with and was raised by the mother. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. The Court
differentiated between a developed parent-child relationship and simply the "potential" for a
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65
thereafter by Michael H. v. Gerald D., reflected deference to the
"historic respect-indeed sanctity would not be too strong a termtraditionally accorded the relationships that develop within the unitary
family," a concept that was held to include the household of unmarried
parents and their children. 66 Returning again to the theme that pervaded
its privacy decisions, the Court asserted that constitutional protection
was accorded the sanctity of the family "precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and

tradition." 67 The failure to adequately demonstrate either assumption of

relationship as of primary importance in determining whether the putative father's rights would
be upheld. Id. at 256; see also Hopkins v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 437 S.E.2d 542, 544 (S.C.
1993) (affirming family court refusal to terminate the paternal rights where father had "done
everything within his means not to abandon but rather to establish a parent-child bond").
64. In Caban v. Mohammed, decided a year after Quilloin, the Court overturned a New York
statute that permitted an unmarried mother to veto adoption, but not unmarried fathers. Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). In responding to the mother's assertion that there was a
fundamental difference between paternal and maternal relations, the Court stated that "[e]ven if
unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn infants, this
generalization ... would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age
of the child increased." Id. at 389. The Court also rejected the state's argument that requiring the
consent of the natural father would seriously impair the ability of illegitimate children to be
adopted and thereby legitimized. Id. at 391-92. Notwithstanding that the best interests of the
child may be adoption into a stable two-parent home, this did not justify the use of a gender-based
distinction to achieve that goal. Id. at 392. "The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of
classifying unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a
concerned judgment as to the fate of their children." Id. at 394. However, the Court noted that
the state could enact a more narrowly-drawn statute under which putative fathers might be
precluded from vetoing an adoption based on their failure to establish a relationship with the child
or acknowledge paternity that would be reasonably related to the state's interest without treating
similarly situated persons differently. Id. at 391-92.
65. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989).
66. Id. at 123.
67. See id. at 124 (acknowledging that the concept of the family unit included the household
of unmarried parents and their children). Unfortunately, based on decisions such as Quilloin,
Caban and Lehr, the fact that a putative father might be entitled to notice and a hearing does not
mean that his parental rights will not be terminated during adoption proceedings where the
mother has remarried or given the child up for adoption. Caban, 441 U.S. at 414-15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, stated that an adoption decree that
terminates the parental relationship between an unwed father and the child, even where the father
has an established relationship,
may also be justified by a finding that the adoption will serve the best interest of the
child, at least in a situation such as this in which the natural family unit has already
been destroyed, the father has previously taken no steps to legitimate the child, and a
further requirement such as a showing of unfitness would entirely deprive the childand the State-of the benefits of adoption and legitimation.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (expressing similar
views as the Court in Michael H.). But see In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d 1029 (Kan.
1994) (upholding district court denial of a petition to adopt child over natural father's wishes); In
re Adoption of J.J.B., 868 P.2d 1256, 1262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (overturning nonconsensual
adoption absent some finding of parental unfitness and rejecting termination where sole reason
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financial responsibility or the existence of a meaningful parent-child
relationship significantly impaired, if not eliminated, any right of the
father to object to or veto adoption or placement decisions by the
68
mother.
What is clear from these decisions is that putative fathers are faced

with a Hobson's choice in order to retain any parental rights at all. On
one hand, they can marry the mother to obtain the protections and
presumptions afforded married fathers, even though they may
subsequently divorce. 69 Quilloin clearly differentiated between the

rights of married and unwed fathers, with married fathers presumed not
only to accept greater responsibilities by virtue of their marital status
but also to have an established relationship with the child by virtue of
the family unit.70 Alternatively, they must register their paternity, seek
custody, and make every effort to "participate" in the rearing of the
child, hoping that the court, in a subsequent action, concludes that their
was best interest of child).
68. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett,
Re-expressing Parenthood,98 Yale L.J. 293, 316-19 (1988) (suggesting that in the context of
adoption proceedings, rigidly applying a requirement that a meaningful paternal parent-child
relationship exist prior to according any weight to paternal interests, while presuming the
existence of a maternal relationship, "in some instances may have the effect of treating a decision
by the mother to place her child for adoption as an exercise of her (superior) parental rights rather
than as a forfeiture of them"); Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathersand Adoption: A Theoretical

Analysis in Context, 72 TEX L. REV. 967, 1000-08 (1994) (discussing various approaches
adopted by courts in applying threshold requirements to unwed fathers seeking an order to
establish paternal rights to object to adoption proceedings).
69. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Stewart's dissent in Caban in fact noted
that a putative father can marry the mother and ensure the protection of his rights, stating that "[it
seems to me that the absence of a legal tie with the mother may in such circumstances
appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might otherwise exist by
virtue of the father's actual relationship with the children." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-55 (upholding a New York law that denied a putative father notice of
adoption against a Due Process and Equal Protection challenge because he established only a
biological link). Professor Dolgin argues that paternal rights with respect to their children are
conditioned upon cultural, as opposed to biological ties. She asserts that whether the view of
paternal rights is conditioned upon marriage to the mother or behavioral involvement with the
child, are premised on certain assumptions about family. She argues that the conditioning of
paternal rights on behavioral involvement with the child reflects an erosion of the long held
traditional form of 'family':
This second position, presuming legal paternity to follow from the development of a
relationship between a father and his biological child, more fully rejects the old order
in which familial relationships are deeply embedded in traditional forms that entail
clear rights and obligations, and reflects a newer world of "economic man," connected
to others only through a network of impersonal economic relationships.
Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note 55, at 649.

70. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; see Forman, supra note 68, at 967 (discussing theories of
fatherhood and accompanying rights and interest in the child, including fatherhood defined by
marital rights, genetics, or upon affirmative assumption of responsibility).
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efforts were "enough.'
Notwithstanding the putative father's clear lack of rights in
procreative decisions and the limited constitutional protection afforded
his rights upon the child's birth, a determination of paternity carries
State and federal
with it significant economic consequences. 72
legislatures as well as the courts have imposed an unequivocal
obligation to provide child support. 7 3 "[T]he putative father has no

legitimate right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial
74
by state law.
obligations to his natural child that are validly imposed

The legal obligation to support imposed on the man has evolved from
the still-recognized marital presumption to include an marital or non-

marital child for which a genetic relationship is shown.
71. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (noting that Due Process protection would be afforded in
situations where the putative father demonstrates "full commitment" to being a father); see also
Toni L. Craig, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect Unwed Fathers in
ContestedAdoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 391 (1998) (advocating for the implementation of a
biological rights doctrine to facilitate recognition of unwed biological fathers' interests in
adoption cases); Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note 55, at 650 (arguing that the Supreme Court cases
explicating the paternal rights of unwed fathers could only be reconciled if a father establishes a
relationship with his biological father). Dolgin asserts that paternal rights of unwed fathers can
be reconciled:
[11f the apparently sufficient requirement for effecting legal paternity-that a father
effect a social relationship with his biological child-is read as code for the
requirement that he effect that relationship within the context of family, most easily
identified in cases in which the father has established a marriage or marriage-like
relationship with the child's mother.
Id.
72. Paternity carries with it social and moral consequences as well. See, e.g., McCulley, supra
note 4, at 21 (quoting Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 584 (1987), as stating that "[a]long with
the financial and legal implications involved, the paternity determination creates a parent-child
relationship, which is a pronouncement of far more than a financial responsibility. [Meaning
that] the adjudicated father 'assumes a cultural role with distinct moral expectations"').
McCulley argues that social consequences can also stem from adjudicated paternity proceedings,
citing comments by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Rivera v. Minnick that an adjudicated father
would be subject to moral opprobrium for failing to voluntarily embrace his parental role. Id.
73. See, e.g., Jo Michelle Beld & Len Biernat, Federal Intent for State Child Support
Guidelines: Income Shares, Cost Shares, and the Realities of Shared Parenting, 37 FAM. L. Q.
165, 165 (2003) ("Presumptive guidelines for the determination of child support orders have been
in effect in every state since 1990. It would be hard to overstate the impact of these guidelines on
the economic circumstances of millions of children and their separated parents."); see also In re
Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989) ("[B]iological father, wed or unwed, has a responsibility to
provide support during the prebirth period."); Hiester, supra note 4, at 218-20 (discussing federal
and state statutes).
74. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987).
75. Donald Hubin suggests that there are both genetic paternity and causal paternity and that
"the genetic and causal elements of paternity are conceptually, and sometimes empirically,
separate. Keeping them separate is crucial to solving some of the legal conundrums concerning
paternity." Hubin, supra note 59, at 65. The refinement of DNA paternity testing has added to
the exceptions to the marital presumption, where the husband makes a timely challenge to
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In fact, the genetic link between a man and his biological child can
create a legal obligation in the absence of any concomitant social
connection, as in the case of biological fathers required to provide
financial support for their offspring even in cases in which the mother
is married to another man....

The state relies on the genetic tie

between a man and a child to hold the man financially responsible for
what is his even where the man can claim no familial rights to the
child he must support because he chose to sire the child outside a
76

family setting.
Even without a genetic tie, however, a man can still be held
responsible for the care and support of a child where he has held the
child out as his own and/or failed to undertake a timely investigation of
his suspicions regarding paternity. 77 Failure to pay child support when
due puts the man at risk of imprisonment, wage garnishment, and other

paternity, and further enables identification of the actual genetic father to whom the support
obligation would then attach. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 §§ 1-30; see also
Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note 55, at 663 n. 114 (detailing cases that discuss the contractual
obligations owed by biological fathers). Courts have also found legal fatherhood where the child
was the result of a surrogacy contract. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, the court stated "[i]ndeed
the establishment of fatherhood and the consequent duty to support when a husband consents to
the artificial insemination of his wife is one of the well-established rules of family law." In re
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); see also People v.
Sorenson, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 13 (Cal. 1968) (affirming conviction of man for failure to support a
child conceived through artificial insemination).
76. Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note 55, at 645-46; see also Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining
or Biology? The History and Future of PaternityLaw and ParentalStatus, 14 CORNELL J. L &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 8-9 (2004) (commenting that "much paternity law seems to be based on a strict
liability theory for genetic contribution"); Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part 11:
Questioning the Paternity of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 60 (2003) (analyzing paternity
disestablishment in cases where marital children are involved); Kristen Santillo, Disestablishment
of Paternity and The Future of Child Support Obligations, 37 FAM. L.Q. 503 (2003) (discussing
attempts made to balance interests of non-biological fathers, children, and the state).
77. See Baker, supra note 76, at 1 (discussing circumstances where support obligations can be
imposed even in the absence of a genetic tie); Roberts, supra note 76, at 60. Roberts asserts:
Timing matters; a man who suspects he is not the biological father of his wife's child
and fails to act on his suspicions, faces an uphill battle in disestablishing paternity. A
man who waits for years before seeking genetic tests to confirm or rebut his suspicions
is likely to be estopped from denying his paternity.
Id.; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (establishing timeframes within which paternity can be
challenged); Santillo, supra note 57, at 506 (noting that states have passed limitations periods
within which fathers who fail to discover that "children born during the marriage are not
biologically related to them ... are compelled to retain the legal status of father"). Santillo
contends that forcing men to support children that are not biologically theirs diverts resources,
and therefore places a financial strain upon their biological children. Santillo, supra note 57, at
510. She notes that some states will permit fathers to challenge paternity based on newly
discovered evidence regardless of the limitations period to address situations where the father had
no reason to suspect or challenge paternity, although some exceptions exist to this right. Id. at
511-13.
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sanctions. 78 Federal statutes have required mothers seeking Aid for
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")7 9 to identify the father
and cooperate in state efforts to obtain child support.80 In addition to
ensuring that the mother receives financial assistance in raising the
child, the state has an articulated interest in enforcing paternal support
81
obligations so that the child does not become a public charge. Unless
support obligations continue
and until parental rights are terminated,
82
child.
the
of
minority
the
throughout

These obligations cannot be waived, either through contract or
otherwise. 83 In this respect, both married and unmarried fathers are
78. See, e.g., UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT; CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT, 18
U.S.C. § 228 (detailing consequences for failure to provide child support); IND. CODE § 35-46-15 (1978) (imposing criminal sanctions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1995) (imposing criminal
sanctions); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 244-C (1998) (regarding suspension of professional, occupational
and business licenses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-941 (West 1997) (dealing with the revocation of
recreational, drivers and professional licenses); see also McCulley, supra note 4, at 5-8
(examining state and federal procedures enforcing child support).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-669b (1997). The statute further requires that the mother assign all
rights to receive child support to the state. "In order to participate ...states must require that
[the] recipient family assign its right to receive child support to the state; states are then required
to collect any support money and to offset them against amounts paid in AFDC.... 42 U.S.C. §
657 (1997).
80. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647 (1975) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 651-669b (1975). Congress passed the Family Support Act in 1988, which among
other things, requires states to obtain social security numbers of both parents upon birth of the
child. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2344-51 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
81. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987) (finding that "the putative father has no
legitimate right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial obligations to his natural
child that are validly imposed by state law"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978)
(finding that "if the State believes that parents of children out of their custody should be
responsible for ensuring that those children do not become public charges, this interest can be
achieved by adjusting the criteria used for determining the amounts to be paid under their support
orders").
82. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 583 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion
in Rivera v. Minnich, stated: "What is at stake for a defendant in such a proceeding is not merely
the prospect of a discrete payment in satisfaction of a limited obligation. Rather, it is the
imposition of a lifelong relationship with significant financial, legal, and moral dimensions." Id.
In Rivera, the Court considered the evidentiary standard required in paternity determinations,
suggesting that a paternity proceeding required only a "preponderance of the evidence" standard
of proof. Id. at 586.
83. See, e.g., New York Family Court Act §§ 413, 416(a) (1977) (prohibiting release of father
from support obligations by contract); Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 847 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding as unenforceable a mother's promise not to pursue paternity determination
and child support since "the duty of child support cannot be bartered away permanently to the
detriment of the child"); Paul M. v. Teresa M., 818 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that the duty of support cannot be relinquished to the detriment of the child); Faske v Bonanno,
357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. App. 1984) (disallowing misrepresentation of contraceptive
protection as a defense); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. & C. 4th 353, 364 (Pa. Com. P1.
2002) (refusing to enforce oral contract for artificial insemination and holding the donee

1064

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

treated alike. The obligation to support a natural child is nondiscriminatory. Nevertheless, while both parents are held responsible
for the care and support of the child, the financial burden is not
necessarily equal. 84 In post-divorce situations, for example, researchers
documented a drop in the standard of living for the custodial mother
while the father's standard of living increased.8 5 Moreover, Lenore
Weitzman's findings that the standard of living for women and children
post-divorce dropped seventy-three percent while the standard for men
increased by forty-two percent "prompted a wide array of advocates to

suggest that fathers must compensate mothers 86for this differential
change in their relative economic prospects."
Although some
researchers argue that there is in fact no disparity, 8 7 and despite errors
subsequently discovered in Weitzman's results, child support reform
efforts nonetheless target the assumed gap through increases in
awards. 8 8 In many states, the obligation imposed upon the putative
father, while designated child support, is in excess of the amount needed
to support the child simply because the father can afford more. 89 The
responsible for paying child support).
84. See Hiester, supra note 4, at 233 ("All that is required to enforce a child-support
obligation against a man is the mere fact of his genetic relationship to the child. On the other
hand, because a woman has the fight to terminate her pregnancy, child-support obligations can
never be enforced against her without her consent to the existence of a parental obligation.").
85. See, e.g., Sanford L. Braver, Ph.D., The Gender Gap in Standardof Living After Divorce:
Vanishing Small?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 111, 112 (1999) (criticizing flaws in research methodologies
demonstrating post-separation standard of living between mothers and fathers); Hubin, supra note
59, at 35 ("In 2000, 32.5% of single mother households with children were below the poverty
level, compared with only 16.1% of single father households with children and only 6% of
married couple households with children under the age of eighteen.").
86. Braver, supra note 85, at 113-14. Braver notes that Weitzman's results were widely cited
although she subsequently "acknowledged that her original figures were wrong" and argued that
the disparity was substantially smaller. Id. at 115-16.
87. Id. at 134. Braver further notes that "after correcting the method for two matters not
hitherto considered, unequal taxes and the sharing of the expenses of the children between the
two parents' households, the gender gap was vanishingly small; it all but disappeared." Id.
88. See Laura Wheaton & Elaine Sorensen, Reducing Welfare Costs and Dependency: How
Much Bangfor the Child Support Buck?, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 23, 24-26 (1998) (examining
the gap and legislative policies aimed at increasing awards to single mothers).
89. See, e.g., Joann P. v. Gary W., 441 A.2d 1161, 1162 (N.H. 1982) (rejecting the
defendant's argument on appeal that his obligation to support the child should not include support
for the mother, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the mother's
needs as well). "The fact of parenthood and the presence of a child determine, in a large measure,
the housing requirement as to location and nature of accommodations as well as her life style."
Id.; see also Smith v. Freeman, 814 A.2d 65, 78 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (holding that "the
determination of 'need' ... takes into account more than just the basic necessities of survival");
Bagley v. Bagley, 632 A.2d 229, 239 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) ("The Bagley children are
entitled to every expense reasonable for a child of someone with Dr. Bagley's affluence."). The
child of a multi-millionaire would be entitled to share in that standard of living and would
accordingly be entitled to a greater award of child support to provide for various luxuries, even
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family court in PamelaP. v. Frank S. noted that:
The child is entitled in this court's opinion to no less a standard of
living than his father's, because it indicates the likely level that the
child would enjoy if he had been born into the still-prevalent
an intact family or a father willingly sharing his
circumstance of 90
custody and care.
In essence, the support obligations can become a combination of child
support and implicit palimony-the child should live in a manner to
marriedwhich he or she would be entitled if the parents 9 were
1
be.
would
ever
or
were
ever
they
regardless of whether

III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MISREPRESENTATION OF FERTILITY CLAIMS
The lack of significant paternal rights coupled with the economic and
emotional obligations accompanying fatherhood lead to an
understandable outrage upon discovery of deceit involving
representations of fertility or contraceptive use. Efforts to assuage this
outrage through the judicial system have been singularly unsuccessful
tort.9 2
regardless of whether the claims have sounded in contract or
Although the outcomes have been unsuccessful, the courts have not
adopted a consistent approach in denying paternal misrepresentation of
fertility claims and articulated rationales have ranged from fatally
defective allegations or other deficiencies in the claim to reliance on
various public policies. In particular, courts have focused on the ability

though provision for such items would not be ordered in a different case. Smith, 814 A.2d at 239.
90. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 348 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983).
91.

See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309, 3 U.L.A. 400 (1987) (permitting

support order that requires either or both parents to pay support in the amount necessary to
maintain same standard of living child would have had absent the divorce); Beld & Biernat, supra
note 73, at 166-67 (discussing the federal child support guidelines and their incorporation into
state statutory approaches to support determinations). Beld and Biernat note that:
[Miost states have adopted one of two general models for the determination of support.
The "percentage-of-obligor-income" model, used in ten states, bases child support on
the income of the obligor alone. In contrast, the "income shares" model, used in
approximately three-quarters of the states, bases support on the combined incomes of
both parents. Thirty-five states rely on a simple income shares approach, while three
states have adopted the more complex Melson formula. The remaining three states'
guidelines have some percentage-of-obligor-income features and other features
consistent with income shares.
Id. at 167; see also Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law Framework-Part

H, 69 Miss. L.J. 1063, 1091-93 (2000) (discussing cases both upholding and rejecting support
awards based on percentage of income approach).
92. See generally Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner's Tort Liability to Other
Partnerfor FraudulentMisrepresentationRegarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control Resulting

in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5TH 301 (1992) (focusing on claims in tort, and particularly, claims for
fraud and misrepresentation).
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of the father to allege justifiable reliance or damages, the applicability
of anti-heartbalm and child support statutes, and constitutional rights of

privacy either as the sole basis for denial or in9 combination
to buttress
3
the conclusion that relief should be unavailable.

1. The Statutory Bar of Anti-HeartbalmLegislation

Beginning in the early 1900s, courts became increasingly disinclined
to permit recovery in tort for claims that emerged out of "tender matters
of romantic or sexual emotion." 94 Claims such as alienation of
affection, breach of promise, or criminal conversation fell into disfavor
under the weight of criticism that such claims were "anachronistic,"
resulted in excessive and unwarranted damage verdicts, and were used
to extort or blackmail a marriage that was no longer wanted.9 5

Underlying much of the criticism was also the implicit belief that

community mores had changed.96 Thus, for example, a failure to
progress from engagement to marriage no longer carried the stigma that
previously may have warranted a breach of promise action.'
As a

result, a number of states enacted what are commonly referred to as
"anti-heartbalm statutes," which bar breach of promise and related cases

93. In cases where the substance of the father's claim was considered, the courts ultimately
concluded that there had been either an alleged insufficiency of proof to meet the fraud standard
or belatedly applied public policy principles. See, e.g., Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607,
612 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1982) (holding that father failed to prove either misrepresentation as to
contraceptive precautions or deception as to contracteption).
94. Askew v. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
95. See Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992) (abolishing tort of criminal
conversation and stating "[s]uch suits invite abuse" and were based on "anachronism"); Helsel v.
Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. 2003) (abolishing tort of alienation of affection); Jeffrey D.
Kobar, Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1770, 1775-78 (1985)

(discussing the underlying policies and limitations of heartbalm statutes). But see Norton v.
MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991) ("To a large extent, the basis for abuse has diminished as
the Victorian attitudes towards sex have diminished and yielded to a much more frank and open
attitude ....).
96. See Helsel, 107 S.W.3d at 232 (arguing that revenge, not reconciliation, is the primary
motive); Norton, 818 P.2d at 14 (declining to abolish tort of alienation of affection).
97. Kobar, supra note 95, at 1778. Jeffrey D. Kobar states that:
Engagements are now viewed as important trial periods when couples can determine if
they do indeed want to commit their lives to each other, and during which the freedom
to decline marriage without sanction is essential. Enforcing marriage promises
destroys the social utility of this trial period, making it 'as expensive to get engaged as
it is to get married.'
Id; see also Jane E. Larson, Women UnderstandSo Little They Call My Good Nature "Deceit":A

Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993) (discussing common law claim
of seduction and proposing tort of sexual fraud); Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement,
107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998) (discussing engagement and conditional gifts).
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98
and abolish the old common law claims.

The trend against such actions has moved slowly, but in the light of

increased emphasis in our society on personal choice, the
decriminalization of sexual activities in many states, and skepticism
[sic] about the role of law in protecting feelings and enforcing highly
personal morality, it seems doubtful that the trend will be reversed. 99
Nonetheless, it became apparent that enactment and enforcement of
the anti-heartbalm statutes reflected a social determination that the
abuses and excesses of such actions were great enough, on balance, to
warrant their abolition and for such conduct to no longer constitute a
civil wrong compensable in tort.10 0 In this respect, the boundaries of
tort law in this area were clearly redrawn.
Not all courts, however, interpreted the anti-heartbalm statutes as a
complete bar to the vicissitudes of ill-fated romance. Some jurisdictions
permitted exceptions for restitution and unjust enrichment even though
the underlying claim sounded in one of the abolished causes of
action. 10 1 Others courts, however, took the position that any action
grounded in those common law claims subject to heartbalm statutes
would be precluded without exception. 1° 2 In A.B. v. C.D., involving an
98. See, e.g., Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 426 nn.1-2 (discussing history of tort of alienation of
affection and criminal conversation and listing states and statutes abolishing those claims).
99. PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 124 at 930 (W. Page Keaton ed., 5th ed. 1984). The
McFarlane court argued that the tort of alienation of affection was not limited to incidents of
sexual misconduct and "lies for all improper intrusions or assaults on the marriage relationship,
whether or not they are associated with extramarital sex." Norton, 818 P.2d at 13. But see
Jonathan Turley, When Lust and the Law Collide, CINNCINATI POST, Sept. 15, 2004, at A19
(reporting on prosecution in Virginia of attorney for adultery under that state's criminal statutes
and noting "[s]ince 1980, adultery cases have been recorded from Alabama to Massachusetts to
Pennsylvania"); Michelle Boorstein, Virginia Adultery Case Goes From Notable to Nonevent,

WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at B4 (discussing a Virginia adultery case).
100. For example:
There is good reason to believe that even genuine actions of this type are brought more
frequently than not with purely mercenary or vindictive motives; that it is impossible to
compensate for such damage with what has derisively been called 'heart balm;' that
people of any decent instincts do not bring an action which merely adds to the family
disgrace; and that no preventive purpose is served, since such torts seldom are
committed with deliberate plan.
PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 99, at 929; see also Larson, supra note 97, at 397 ("Although

latently misogynistic rhetoric fueled the anti-heartbalm reform, in several states women
lawmakers actively initiated the legislative movement to abolish these torts.").
101. See Kobar, supra note 95, at 1772 n.9 (examining precedent based on traditional
common law and equity); see also Richard P. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 n. 3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (declining to permit husband to sue the man who fathered a child in adulterous
relationship with wife in tort, and noting that "[wie do not foreclose the possibility that a man in
Gerald's position might be able to recover actual out of pocket costs incurred in supporting
another man's children on an equitable theory for reimbursement, such as unjust enrichment").
102. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Collins, 263 S.E.2d 115, 119 (Ga. 1980) (holding that there was no
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action for breach of promise, a Pennsylvania district court expressed
discomfort with creating an exception to the bar imposed by the antiheartbalm statutes, stating:
The legislatures did not intend that courts should explore the minds of
suitors and determine their sincerity at the moment of proposal of
marriage but rather declared it to be the policy of the state that in the
event a breach of the promise occurs relief will be denied in the
courts. 103

These jurisdictions even rejected traditional fraud and deceit claims
where they implicated matters of romance or sexual conduct,
proclaiming that the government "did not belong in the bedroom" and
104
that romance was an inappropriate subject for judicial intervention.
Anti-heartbalm legislation was viewed as codifying "the sheer
10 5
unseemliness" of litigating matters deemed to be "intensely private."'
Brandishing cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Stanley v.
Georgia, courts declined to attach tortious liability to intimate matters
between a man and a woman, finding it inconceivable that matters of
the heart belonged in the courtroom. "[T]he judiciary should not
attempt to regulate all aspects of the human condition. Relationships
may take varied forms and beget complications and entanglements
which defy reason." 106 The court in Askew v. Askew bluntly contended
that "[w]ords of love, passion and sexual desire are simply unsuited to
the cumbersome strictures of common law fraud and deceit," 107 calling
the idea of a judge or jury determining whether romantic declarations

cause of action in tort independent of action for breach of promise to marry); Waddell v. Briggs,
381 A.2d 1132, 1136-37 (Me. 1978) (dealing with a state statute that prohibited tort action for
defendant's failure to attend wedding ceremony and breach of promise to marry daughter).
103. A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1940), affd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1017 (3d
Cir. 1941).
104. Government intrusion into the privacy of sexual decisions abounds. A number of states
have penal statutes that criminalize certain sexual behavior, even when performed in the privacy
of the bedroom between consenting adults. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63 (1977) (sodomy in
the first degree); ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1977) (adultery in the first degree); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/11-8 (West. 1990) (fornication); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 35 (Law. Co-op.
1977) (unnatural and lascivious acts); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (Michie 1975) (lewd and
lascivious cohabitation); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (refusing to recognize a
right to privacy in homosexual behavior). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(overruling Bowers).
105. Askew v. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 292-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
106. Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
107. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294; see also Larson, supra note 97, at 410 (suggesting that
judicial reluctance to become involved in sexual misconduct cases may stem in part from the
courts' "lack of confidence in [their] ability to ascertain the presence or absence of sexual
consent"). Larsen asserts that the courts are more likely to become involved in cases presenting
claims of physical injury than emotional harm. Larson, supra note 97, at 411.
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10 8
were fraudulent "ridiculously wooden."

The extent to which actions alleging fraud or deceit 1° 9 fell outside the

scope of anti-heartbalm legislation remained a major area of
disagreement. 1 0 Clearly to some degree the courts are still a haven for
the deceived despite the existence of anti-heartbalm statutes even where

that deceit occurs in the course of intimate relationships.1i '

For

example, most jurisdictions addressing the issue have permitted
recovery in tort for fraudulent or negligent concealment of sexually
112 under various theories including battery, 11 3
transmitted diseases
negligence, 1 14 fraud, and emotional distress. I 15 Courts have also been
108. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
109. Those courts which have held deceit actions barred under the anti-heartbalm statutes
include: Thorpe v. Collins, 263 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. 1980); Waddell v. Briggs, 381 A.2d 1132 (Me.
1978); Thibault v. Lalumiere, 60 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1945); A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85, 87
(E.D. Pa. 1940), affd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1941); Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 6
N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938).
110. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting
the defendant's efforts to avoid the consequences of his misrepresentation that he did not have a
venereal disease prior to intercourse under the state's anti-heartbalm statutes); see also Askew, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (noting that after its enactment "the outer perimeters of the [anti-heartbalm]
statute remained to be mapped out by the courts" and that courts were to look to the substance of
the claim not just how it was styled). But see Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (commenting that cases alleging misrepresentations regarding procreative ability fell
squarely within the anti-heartbalm statutes).
111. Boyd v. Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Langley v. Schumacker, 297 P.2d
977 (Cal. 1956); Perthus v. Paul. 58 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950). In Akrep v. Akrep, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey also permitted an annulment of a non-consummated marriage
sought by the plaintiff wife based on the husband's misrepresentation that he and the plaintiff
would have a religious ceremony subsequent to a civil ceremony. Akrep v. Akrep, 63 A.2d 253,
253-55 (N.J. 1949); see also McCulley, supra note 4, at 25-26 (criticizing the decision in
Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) and noting that "the government
interferes with many private sexual decisions, and this interference has been upheld under
scrutiny"); Rudolph, supra note 9, at 331 (noting the occurrence of government intrusion in
intimate relations in misrepresentation cases involving sexually transmitted disease, divorce and
annulment, rape and spousal rape, among others). But see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 85 A.2d
706, 720-21 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951) (holding that an annulment sought by husband based on
misrepresentations by the wife prior to marriage did go to the essentials of the marriage contract);
Rhoades v. Rhoades, 72 A.2d 412, 413-14 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1950) (rejecting husband's claim
for annulment of his consummated marriage despite his assertion that his wife falsely represented
that she had borne him a child and that based on this representation they got married).
112. In Kathleen K. v. Robert B., the plaintiff alleged the defendant intentionally
misrepresented that he was free of venereal disease and that in reliance thereon, she engaged in
sexual intercourse. Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
Reversing the lower court's dismissal of the complaint based on privacy considerations, the
appellate court stated that the right to privacy did not protect intentionally tortious conduct that
resulted in physical injury in the form of contagious disease. Id at 277.
113. See, e.g., Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to
bar a woman from bringing an action in battery for suffering an etopic pregnancy with a man who
claimed he could not get her pregnant).
114. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Md. 1988) (permitting recovery for
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willing to set aside a marriage procured through fraud, or where there
has been a breach of a fiduciary relationship. 16 These courts easily
overcame the distaste of peeking into the bedroom in order to afford
redress for the alleged harm.
Several courts allowed privacy

concerns to be outweighed by the state interest in protecting health and
welfare, even though the claims before it were purely private. The court
in Kathleen K. v. Robert B., for example, pointed to "[t]he tortious

nature of respondent's conduct, coupled with the interest of this state in
the prevention and control of contagious and dangerous diseases" as

permitting inquiry into private sexual conduct. 118 That court held that
"[t]he right of privacy is not absolute, and in some cases is subordinate
to the state's fundamental right to enact laws which promote public

health, welfare and safety, 19even though such laws may invade the
offender's right of privacy.,,'
Courts have been less sanguine, however, on whether claims of
misrepresentation of fertility or use of birth control, clearly precedent to
agreeing to sexual intimacies, fall within the scope of the anti-heartbalm
statutes. 120 Some courts likened misrepresentation-of-fertility claims to
the old common law claims for seduction or alienation of affections and

negligent transmission of herpes); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ga. App. 1985)
(permitting recovery for negligent transmission of herpes).
115. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d at 1180, 1184 (permitting possible actions for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
116. Tacchi v. Tacchi, 195 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). In Tacchi v. Tacchi,
the court held that the plaintiff husband was entitled to annulment of marriage where prior to the
marriage the defendant was allegedly pregnant with plaintiffs child, and defendant's mother
falsely represented that defendant was under age and threatened plaintiff with criminal
prosecution for sex with a minor if he did not marry her. Id. The court found that although the
representations were made by the defendant's mother, the defendant had acquiesced in them and
therefore participated in the fraud. Id. at 894. Finding that the child was not the plaintiff's, the
court, in addition to granting the annulment, also denied the defendant's motion for support. Id.
at 893.
117. "The right of privacy, hallowed when the woman misrepresents, disappears from the
judicial analysis when the man commits the same tort." Rudolph, supra note 9, at 331.
118. Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
119. Id.; see also Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
state interest in prevention and control of disease warranted intervention in some circumstances
where intervention might otherwise have been inappropriate).
120. See, e.g., Jose F. v. Pat M., 586 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735-36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (noting that
to allow a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of disputes "in a marital
context would "subvert legislative intent in outlawing this type of lawsuit"); Inez M. v. Nathan
G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) ("The cause of action of fraud and deceit within
the context of a paternity proceeding may well suffer from the very same problems that impelled
legislative abolition of causes of action 'based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry."').
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utilized anti-heartbalm legislation to deny relief. 12 1 In Jose F. v. Pat
M., the court considered, among other things whether New York's antiheartbalm statutes precluded the plaintiffs claims for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") as a result of the

defendant mother's representations that she was using contraception in
order to induce the plaintiff to begin a sexual relationship.12 2 In
concluding that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed, the court was
concerned that allowing the action to proceed would "subvert legislative
intent in outlawing this type of lawsuit." 123 New York did not
recognize IIED claims in the context of marital disputes in light of the

state's anti-heartbalm legislation abolishing claims for alienation of
affection and related actions. 124 In order to bring the plaintiff within
this exclusion, the court found the unmarried plaintiffs relationship
with the defendant to be "so akin to a conjugal one that the same public
policy considerations" would apply. 125
In Perry v. Atkinson, 126 the plaintiff alleged that she obtained an
abortion at the behest of her married lover in reliance on his
127
misrepresentations that he would impregnate her the following year.
The lower court sustained the demurrer to the fraud claim on the basis
that it would violate public policy and interfere with the parties' right to
privacy. 128 The California appellate court characterized its inquiry as
whether the plaintiff had a cause of action for "fraudulent breach of
promise to impregnate." 129 The court held that to permit the plaintiff to
121. See, e.g., Perry, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 406 (finding no cause of action existed for a man's
fraud and deceit in misrepresenting his intentions to provide a plaintiff with a child); Jose F., 586
N.Y.S.2d at 736 ("It is inappropriate for the court to intrude into an intimate relationship in an
attempt to substantiate what is tantamount to an action for seduction."); Venus B. v. Danillo S.,
446 N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (commenting that mother's claim of fraudulent
inducement not to file a paternity action might fall within claims no longer recognized in New
York and constitute matters considered private and inappropriate to intrusion by the court).
122. Jose F., 586 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
123. Id. at 736.
124. Id. at 735.
125. Id. at 736; see also supra note 120 (discussing the New York Family Court's
consideration of claims of fraud in paternity proceedings). In Inez M. v. Nathan G., the New
York Family Court acknowledged that actions for fraud raised in a paternity proceeding "may
well suffer from the very same problems that impelled legislative abolition of causes of action
'based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of
contract to marry."' Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982).
126. Perry, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
127. Id. at 403. The plaintiff alleged causes of action for fraud and deceit and for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id.
128. Id. (noting that although the emotional distress claim proceeded to trial, the parties
settled it prior to the conclusion of the trial).
129. Id. at 404 ("Although Perry's cause of action is couched in terms of a tort, the behavior
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maintain such a claim would involve the court in the parties' private
procreative decisions-matters that were intensely private. Pointing to
California's anti-heartbalm statutes, the court concluded that the
plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of "sexual conduct and
interpersonal decisions [that] are, on public policy grounds, outside the
30
realm of tort liability." 1
The Perry court discussed two other California decisions involving
claims surrounding conception, Stephen K. v. Roni L. 131 and BarbaraA.
v. John G., 132 noting that in its view, both should have been decided
under the anti-heartbalm provisions of the California Civil Code. 133 "In
both, the complaining parties alleged they engaged in sexual relations
induced by a false representation regarding their partners' procreative
ability. Both cases fall squarely within Civil Code Section 43.5,
subdivision (c) precluding a cause of action for seduction." 134 In
Stephen K., the father had counterclaimed for compensatory and
punitive damages in a paternity suit brought by the mother, alleging she
had misrepresented that she was using birth control. 135 The appellate
court affirmed the lower court dismissal for failure to state a claim for

relief. 136
The court in BarbaraA., however, permitted the mother's claim for
fraud to proceed despite allegations of similar misrepresentations by the
father, finding they were not barred by the state's anti-heartbalm statute.
"In the instant case appellant complains not because her virtue was
violated or because she suffered humiliation and loss of reputation, but
because the sexual act was unprotected and led to an ectopic pregnancy
as a result of respondent's misrepresentation."'137 The BarbaraA. court
distinguished Stephen K. as seeking damages for the wrongful birth of a
child, whereas there was no child in the case before it and instead the
plaintiff was seeking damages for physical harm arising out of an
ectopic pregnancy.'138
of which she complains is Atkinson's breach of a promise to impregnate her..
.
130. Id. at 405. The court noted that under California Civil Code section 43-4, "[i]f no cause
of action can exist in tort for a fraudulent promise to fulfill the rights, duties and obligations of a
marriage relationship, then logically no cause of action can exist for a fraudulent promise by a
married man to impregnate a woman not his wife." Id.
131. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
132. Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
133. Perry, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
134. Id. at 405.
135. Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
136. Id.
137. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
138. Id. at 429; see also Richard P. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249-50 (Cal. Ct.
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Without doubt, anti-heartbalm statutes were designed to reach at least
some claims that were premised upon deceitful conduct. Actions for
seduction and breach of promise to marry are, at bottom, often founded
on deceit-the consent to sexual conduct in reliance upon claims of
undying love and future marriage or some other tangible or intangible
benefit.139 The enactment of the anti-heartbalm statutes was a function
not just of the decreasing stigma of the non-marital state but also of an
effort to curb the abuses of the torts of criminal conversation and breach
of promise. These torts generally can be categorized as simply the
broken pieces of a romance that died, or the consequences of poor
character judgment where the harm distills down to hurt feelings or
embarrassment-situations squarely within the ambit of claims the
statutes targeted. Thus, despite the broad reach sometimes given by
some courts, the focus of the anti-heartbalm statutes was principally on
protection from hurt feelings in a romantic
removing judicial
140
relationship.
Cases involving misrepresentation of fertility or the use of birth
control, however, are not concerned with disgruntlement at a
relationship that may have soured or the trampling of tender feelings or
even with questions of morality. Rather, the harm is centered on the
creation of unavoidable lifetime legal and personal obligations without
consent and in direct contravention of express representations.
Centering refusal to entertain any claim that is birthed by a romantic or
sexual relationship to the existence of anti-heartbalm statutes would
seem to be misplaced. Misrepresentation of fertility claims only
tangentially touch issues of seduction or inducements to intercourse.
The complaint is not that intercourse would not have occurred, but that
it would not have occurred without contraception-a very different
issue. Despite the facial appeal of using anti-heartbalm statutes as a
convenient vehicle to deny misrepresentation of fertility claims, it is
questionable whether they were designed to extend to claims of this
App. 1988) (distinguishing cases permitting fraud actions to be maintained based on
misrepresentations of sterility, finding that those cases involved claims of physical damage and
no potential for harm to innocent children).
139. See, e.g., Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (discussing the old action for seduction,
which involved illicit intercourse through "arts, persuasions, or wiles 'to overcome the resistance
of a female who is not disposed of her own volition to step aside from the paths of virtue"' (citing
Davis v. Stroud, 52 Cal. App. 2d 308, 317 (1942))).
140. See Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 939 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (noting that
"amatory torts (seduction, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation) have been
abolished" and that "public policy no longer considers money damages appropriate for what is
perceived as only an ordinary broken heart" (citing Quinn v. Walsh, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 70102 & nn.8, 9 (2000))).
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sort.
2. The ParentalSupport Obligationand Paternity
Although some jurisdictions found state anti-heartbalm statutes
dispositive, others gave cursory, if any, acknowledgement to any
similarities with the old common law claims, thus avoiding inquiry into
the impact of anti-heartbalm legislation. 14 1 These courts chose instead
to rest their decisions to permit or deny a claim based on
misrepresentations of fertility in statements of public policy and placed
a particular emphasis on the policies behind paternity and child support
statutes.142 In Wallis v. Smith, 14 3 for example, the New Mexico court,
in rejecting the father's claim against the mother for damages arising
out of her false representation that she was u sing birth control, held that
the claim simply was not cognizable regardless of the theory
asserted. 144 "[W]e elect to rely primarily on the prevailing public
policy of child support, while at the same time recognizing the serious
privacy concerns implicated and threatened by the underlying
lawsuit." 145 A similar conclusion was reached in Welzenbach v.
Powers, where the court held that the injuries alleged by the plaintiff
father as a result of misrepresentations regarding contraceptive use were

141. See, e.g., Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1982). ("The
cause of action of fraud and deceit within the context of a paternity proceeding may well suffer
from the very same problems that impelled legislative abolition of causes of action 'based upon
alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to
marry."').
142. See Beard v. Skipper, 451 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (asserting the
inability of a father to use misrepresentation by a mother of contraceptive use as a defense to
support obligation); Faske v. Bonnano, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (finding a
parental obligation of support notwithstanding the circumstances of conception); Welzenbach v
Powers, 660 A.2d 1133, 1136 (N.H. 1995) (holding that public policy barred actions by a father
of reliance on a mother's assurances of contraceptive use). The court in Tharp v. Black, No.
C036767, 2001 WL 1380406, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2001), an unpublished California
decision, stated that "public policy considerations weigh against allowing the sort of damages
plaintiff claims here" noting that payment of damages would reduce one parent's ability to
support the child and expressing concern that such actions "could be emotionally unhealthy to the
children should they come to understand they were the damages claimed in their mother's suit
against their father." Id. at 5. Of course, any litigation including debtor-creditor litigation
threatens the ability of the person sued to support his or her child. Since there is no immunity
from litigation based on the status of being a parent, this argument lacks credibility standing
alone.
143. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
144. Id. at 683. The father alleged causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, conversion
and "prima facie tort." Id.
145. Id. at 685 (citation omitted). The court was concerned about the constitutional
implications created by the privacy issues and found it unnecessary to reach them in the case
before it. Id. at 685 n.1.
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simply not actionable:

Some risks exist without the benefit of a legal remedy. To

permit the plaintiff to proceed on the facts of this case would
ignore strong public policy considerations unfavorable to him,
lay the groundwork for the extension of such claims in the area of
interspousal torts, ignore rights of privacy in constitutionally protected
areas of 'marriage, family and sex,' ... and invite the courts into the

bedroom .... 146
There has been universal rejection of affirmative defenses or
counterclaims alleging fraud in paternity or support actions. 147 In Linda
D. v. Fritz C., for example, the court considered whether allegations of

misrepresentation of birth control had any relevance in the context of

paternity actions. 14 8 The court suggested that the claim might be viable
in a separate action unrelated to the Uniform Parentage Act issues
currently before it, but concluded that fault had no place in the
149 A Minnesota court in
determination of parentage or child support.
5
Murphy v. Myers1 noted that the function of a paternity action was to
establish the paternity of a child and impose a duty of support obligation

thereby preventing the child from becoming a charge
upon both parents,
15 1
of the state.

146. Welzenbach v. Powers, 660 A.2d 1130, 1136 (N.H. 1995) (citations omitted).
147. See, e.g., Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 847 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that birth control fraud by mother would not bar action for paternity); Beard, 451 N.W.2d at 615
(holding that the fraud of mother could not be used to mitigate amount of support paid by father);
Murphy v. Myers, 560 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that fraud and
misrepresentation were barred as defenses in paternity or child support action); Linda D. v. Fritz
C., 687 P.2d 223, 227 (Wash. App. 1984) (noting that the father's claims for misrepresentation by
the mother were irrelevant to determination of child support in paternity action under Uniform
Parentage Act). The court in Inez M. also considered whether defendant's fraud claim would
survive outside the context of paternity proceedings. Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607,
611 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). That court noted that New York had adopted an expansive view of
actionable fraud, but defendant had failed to sufficiently introduce evidence to prove a
misrepresentation. Id. at 612. Although the court did appear to consider the substantive merits of
defendant's fraud claim it is unclear whether, given the context in which it was presented, relief
would have been afforded had defendant's proof been sufficient. Id. at 608-09.
148. Linda D., 687 P.2d at 223.
149. Id. at 229; see also Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 887, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)
("'Procedurally and technically' Moorman's claim is 'separate and apart from any issue of either
parent's obligation to raise and support the child."') (citations omitted).

150. Murphy, 560 N.W.2d at 752.
151. Id. at 754. The Minnesota court in Murphy held:
In addition to issues of monetary support, a child has unique interests in the
establishment of paternity for the purpose of securing legal rights such as inheritance,
medical support, the ability to bring certain causes of action ... workers' compensation
dependent's allowances, and veterans' education benefits.
Id. (citation omitted).
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As a consequence, paternity actions seeking support determinations
focused on those factors related to the needs of the child and the
financial position of the parents. 152 Since the obligation was owed to
the child, not to the mother, fault in conception was irrelevant either to
the threshold question of paternity or the amount of support.' 5 3 Courts
expressed concern that permitting one parent to recover the costs of
statutory child support from the other would defeat the purposes of the
support statutes. 15 4 The court in Barbara A., in distinguishing the

earlier California decision in Stephen K., noted that in cases where a
child had been born, permitting damages for maternal
misrepresentations "would have the practical effect of reducing or
eliminating support from the father by way of offset.., clearly against

public policy and the statutory mandate." 15 5

Concern was also

expressed about the potential for such a defense to create a sub-class of

children,

effectively

undermining

Supreme

Court jurisprudence

establishing the equal protection rights of illegitimate children. I56
The sole case holding that the mother's misconduct should impact a
child support award was reversed on appeal.' 5 7 In Pamela P. v. Frank
152. See, e.g., Linda D., 687 P.2d at 226 (going over the statute that provides the factors
courts consider when calculating financial support). Child support statutes typically list factors to
be considered by the court in assessing support including income, the needs of the child, and
related matters. See, e.g., Murray & Winslet, supra note 9, at 830 (listing the various factors
courts should consider in determining support payments).
153. Linda D., 687 P.2d at 223; see also Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 847 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1993) ("To permit this defense [of birth control fraud], as one that assigns fault for
conception, would result in the denial of support to innocent children whom the law was designed
to protect."); Faske v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) ("Parents have an
obligation to support their children and the circumstances of a child's conception do not give rise
to an exception to that rule."); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S.,449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y 1983)
(holding that the child support statute does not permit consideration of wrongful conduct of
parent as a defense to avoid such support), rev'g Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. 1981).
154. See Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (finding
that child support statutes impose support obligations regardless of fault and that it consequently
would be against public policy to allow avoidance of those support payments based on claims of
fraud); see also Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding it
inappropriate for the court to intrude upon such a private matter).
155. Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
156. Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) ("Manifestly, the
instant defense would create a new and inferior category of out-of-wedlock child based upon the
circumstances of conception and would subordinate the constitutional rights and other interests of
the child to those of one of the parents."); see also Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2001) (expressing concern over the emotional well-being of the children should they learn
that their mother claimed them as damages in a lawsuit); Tharp v. Black, No. C036767, 2001 WL
1380406, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2001) (upholding a child's best interests regardless of the
circumstances surrounding conception).
157. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 348 (N.Y. Fam.Ct. 1981), rev'd sub nora. L.
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S., the New York Family Court held that equity required the court to
read an exception onto the paternity statutes in light of the mother's
contraception.158
intentional deception regarding her use of
"Petitioner's planned and intentional deceit bars her, in this court's
1 59
In light of
opinion, from financial benefit at respondent's expense."'
the court
for,
the need to ensure that the child was adequately provided
was unwilling to absolve the father from all responsibility despite the
mother's misconduct. 16 Nonetheless, the family court believed that her
deceit appropriately factored into any support award, holding that the
father would not be required to pay support unless and until the
16 1 In
mother's means were insufficient to meet the child's needs.
reversing, the New York Appellate Court held that absent statutory
language to the contrary, the court could not consider alleged parental
16 2
misconduct relating to the sexual intimacies surrounding conception.
Yet even beyond the strictures of paternity actions, courts were
equally reluctant to permit paternal misrepresentation of fertility claims
to proceed.163 Parental support remained a recurring theme in tort
actions outside the family court system, with courts expressing little
hesitation in concluding that tort law should not provide a forum for
efforts to avoid parental responsibility. Reflected in these opinions is a
sense that something is not quite right about a lawsuit by a father
4
against a mother for what in essence is the birth of a child. 1" Claims
for damages by the putative father, regardless of whether they were cast
as non-support-related, were viewed as simply a subterfuge to recover
support payments. 16 5 In Wallis, for example, the plaintiff sought to
recover for the economic injury he suffered due to the birth of the child
but the court interpreted the plaintiffs complaint as an effort to

Pamela P. v. Frank S. 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983).
158. Pamela P., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (noting that "courts have grafted some exceptions onto
the [support] statutes").
159. Id. at 346. The court also considered whether the father's constitutional right to
procreate would be impaired by entry of a support order in these circumstances, finding it would
raise "Constitutional doubt." Id. at 347.
160. Id. at 348.
161. Id.
162. L Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 716.
163. See, e.g., Welzenbach v. Powers, 660 A.2d 1133, 1136 (N.H. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs
claim of misrepresentation for public policy reasons).
164. See, e.g., Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982)
(commenting that fraud is sometimes subordinated to interest in the family unit as a matter of
public policy and stating that although "the law abhors fraud and deceit ...the law affords
primacy to our society's profound commitment to the family and the child even when the
particeps criminis is a member of the protected entity").
165. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683-84 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
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circumvent his statutory child support obligations. 16 6 "In our view, it is
difficult to harmonize the legislative concern for the child, reflected in
the immutable duty of parental support [reflected in the New Mexico
child support statutes], with Wallis's effort in this lawsuit to shift
167
financial responsibility for his child solely to the mother."
Accordingly, the policies that were used to reject affirmative defenses
of fraud in paternity and child custody and support cases were used to
168
deny similar claims in the civil tort action.
3. Failureto State a Claimfor Fraud
Courts have also found claims for misrepresentation of fertility or
contraceptive use to be fatally flawed for failure to state a claim for
relief. These courts, in analyzing the sufficiency of the pleadings to
state claims for fraud, principally focused on the element of justifiable
69
reliance and the ability of the plaintiff to plead and prove damages. 1
a. Failure to allege justifiable reliance
The courts disagree on whether a party to a sexual relationship can
ever justifiably rely upon representations of fertility by the other
partner. 170 Some have baldly stated that reliance upon assertions of
contraceptive use can never be justifiable. 17 1 Inextricably tied to that
conclusion is a basic policy determination that each partner to a sexual
relationship is always responsible for taking their own contraceptive
precautions-neither will be permitted to shift that burden to the other

166. Id.
167. Id. at 684.
168. See, e.g., Tharp v. Black, No. C036767, 2001 WL 1380406, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7,
2001) (denying a plaintiffs claims for reasons of public policy); Welzenbach, 660 A.2d at 1136
(refusing to extend tort liability for public policy reasons); Wallis, 22 P.3d at 686 (denying a tort
claim). Cases such as these reflect the significance accorded to the support obligation, even
outside of family court.
169. "The essential elements of a fraud action are (1) material misrepresentation of existing
fact; (2) scienter; (3) reliance; and (4) causation." Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350,
354 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
170. But see Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 612 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (holding that
a father in a paternity action failed to prove fraud or deceit by the mother without considering
policy arguments).
171. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("Claims such as
those presented by plaintiff... arise from conduct so intensely private that the courts should not
be asked to nor attempt to resolve such claims."); Welzenbach, 660 A.2d at 1136 (stating that
"[t]o permit such actions ... flies in the face of all reason"); C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556,
560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (quoting Richard P. 249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) as stating "the subject matter of the action, however, is not one in which it is appropriate
for the courts to intervene").
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partner.172 InJose F. v.Pat M.,173 the court declined to permit a claim

seeking recovery for misrepresentation of fertility concluding that as a
matter of policy, neither plaintiff's fraud claim nor his claim for
emotional distress was cognizable: "We will not allow a cause of action
which rewards a party for his irresponsibilities and encourages a
disturbing curtailment of the right to privacy."' 174 Other courts have

either directly found that reliance was justified or, by virtue of allowing
recovery, acknowledged that personal relationships can engender the
trust necessary for justifiable reliance. 175 The trial court in Welzenbach
v. Powers "conditionally" found that the plaintiff had alleged the
requisite elements for a misrepresentation claim, but nonetheless
liability
concluded that public policy precluded the extension of
176 tort
child.
a
of
birth
the
of
out
arising
partner
sexual
a
against
The court in Alice D. v. William M., 177 in permitting a claim by the
mother for paternal misrepresentations, found that the plaintiff had
justifiably relied on her partner's representations that he was sterile
stating:

172. Wallis, 22 P.3d at 685 (noting that plaintiff father could have taken his own contraceptive
precautions).
173. Jose F. v. Pat M., 586 N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
174. Id. at 736; see also Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 887, 889 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)
("[T]he moral responsibility for creating a human life is not voidable as if sex were a simple
contractual transaction. We can no more recognize a lawsuit which trivializes the responsibility
for consensual sex than we can one which trivializes life itself.").
175. But see Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that the
plaintiff had failed to allege negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of
misrepresentation that defendant could father children, where the plaintiff alleged existence of
duty of honesty but could not "identify any legally cognizable duty between parties in a dating
relationship, nor [was the court] aware of any legally defined duty applicable in these
circumstances"). Prior scholarship also has considered whether a plaintiff can even meet the
requisite elements of a misrepresentation of fertility claim under the traditional tort forms of fraud
and deceit, and in particular the element of justifiable reliance. See generally J.Terrell Mann,
Misrepresentationof Sterility or of Use of Birth Control, 26 J. FAM. L. 623 (1988) (exploring the
various tort theories of liability pursued in cases of misrepresentation of use of birth control or
infertility); Sarah E. Rudolph, Inequities in the Current JudicialAnalysis of Misrepresentationof
Fertility Claims, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331 (1989) (analyzing the different treatment men and
women receive from courts in cases of misrepresentation regarding contraception use and
fertility); Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner's Tort Liability To Other Partnerfor
Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control Resulting in
Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5TH 301 (1992) (discussing cases of misrepresentation). The viability of
claims sounding in negligence, emotional distress or perhaps breach of contract has also been
considered.
176. Welzenbach, 660 A.2d at 1136; see also C.A.M., 568 A.2d at 560 (quoting Richard P.,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 249 as stating, "[w]e agree with real parties in interest that they have alleged
words which normally would suffice to state tort causes of action for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress").
177. Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
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Considering such factors as the length of time the parties had known
one another, the regularity with which they saw each other, the degree
of intimacy between them and the seriousness to the claimant of the
issue of birth control and of an unwanted pregnancy, I hold that she
was entitled to trust the defendant's statement. 178

Inquiry into the length and circumstances of a relationship in order to
assess whether there were sufficient indicia to support justifiable
reliance is neither untoward nor unusual. 17 9 Although less compelling
in instances of casual sex, established relationships include trust as a
primary component, so that one partner presumably is justified in
relying on representations made by the other as it relates to intimate
aspects.
A policy mandating that reliance on representations of
contraceptive use is never justified is significantly more intrusive into a
relationship.
b. The damage dilemma (Part I)-the birth of a healthy child
In some cases, courts have concluded that as a matter of law the
plaintiff failed to allege damages-a necessary element for fraud-a
conclusion that hinges on the extent to which damages are defined as
the birth of a child.1 8° Many courts implicitly or explicitly adopted the
presumption that has consistently threaded through wrongful birth
18 1
cases-that the birth of a healthy child is not a cognizable injury.
This presumption is premised on the theory that a child (and life) is a
benefit and brings joy to the parents, outweighing any burdens that
might result. 18 2 As a result, neither parent could have suffered injury or
178. Id. at 354. Indeed, the Alice D. court noted that its conclusion might have been different
had those factors not been present. Id. Although the court found that the plaintiff had justifiably
relied on the defendant's misrepresentations, it also found that she had failed to prove the
defendant possessed the scienter necessary to support a fraud claim and imposed liability based
on negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 354-55.
179. Even decisions dismissing paternal claims have nonetheless admitted that the claim did
not fail for lack of sufficiency of the reliance element. Richard P. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 246, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). But see Conley, 806 N.E.2d at 935-37 (involving
misrepresentations by a man that he was fertile when in fact he had had a vasectomy, the court
declined to consider the plaintiffs fraud claim because there were no standards against which to
assess the materiality of his representation).
180. See, e.g., C.A.M., 568 A.2d at 563 (rejecting plaintiff s claim for damages on the basis of
her child).
181. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wilczynski v. Goodman,
391 N.E.2d 479, 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Thibeault v. Larson, 666 A.3d 112, 115 (Me. 1995);
C.A.M., 568 A.2d at 563; Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1986). But see
Lovelace Med. Ctr v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 614 (N.M. 1991) (allowing recovery for emotional
pain and suffering during pregnancy); Zehr v. Haugen, 871 P.2d 1006, 1013 (Or. 1994)
(permitting recovery for healthy child when physician failed to sterilize mother); Marciniak v.
Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Wisc. 1990) (involving negligent sterilization by physician).
182. "It rests also upon the requirement of considering, in addition to the benefits provided by
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damages by the birth of a healthy child, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding conception, with any effort to attach a value considered
inherently speculative. 18 1 "A child is born-how can it be said within
that the monetary cost of that life is
the ambit of legal predictability
' 184
value?"
its
that
worth more
These courts have also expressed concern about the social impact of

permitting such a claim, pointing to the emotional effect on the child

and the family of this type of litigation. 185 Courts were unwilling to
encourage the "unseemly spectacle of parents disparaging the 'value' of
court."1 86
their children or the degree of their affection for them in open
the child, the avoidable consequences or mitigation of damages rule, which would implicate the
controversial and emotionally charged issue of whether the mother should have secured an
abortion or placed the child for adoption." 2 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES § 12:5 (3d ed. 1997).
183. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (finding the injury too
speculative and remote from plaintiffs claim of negligence).
184. Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 887, 889 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (citing McKernan v.
Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1984)).
185. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(displaying concern over the effects that family litigations would have on a child). Richard P.
was an action for fraud and emotional distress against a man who had an affair with a married
woman and fathered two of the children born during the marriage. Id. at 248. The California
court held that although the husband may have been wronged, "[w]e conclude here that any
wrong which has occurred as a result of Richard's actions is not one which can be redressed in a
tort action." Id. at 249. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the anti-heartbalm
statutes precluded the husband's claims, grounding its decision in public policy. Id. It stated that
"the innocent children here may suffer significant harm from having their family involved in
litigation such as this and ...this is exactly the type of lawsuit which, if allowed to proceed,
might result in more social damage than will occur if the courts decline to intervene." Id. at 249;
see also Steve H. v. Wendy S.,67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting a former
spouse's claims for public policy reasons and out of concern for the child). The court in Barbara
A. v. John G. made the following observation:
[W]e think it is not sound social policy to allow one parent to sue the other over the
wrongful birth of their child. Using the child as the damage element in a tortious claim
of one parent against the other could seldom, if ever, result in benefit to a child. Such a
lawsuit would indeed be strong evidence of parental rejection, which could only be
emotionally detrimental to the child. Such an action, with its potential for engendering
disharmony between a mother and father, would also be contrary to the spirit of the
recent legislation providing for mediation between parents in order to reduce acrimony.
Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
186. Moorman, 773 P.2d at 889 (citing McKernan, 687 P.2d at 855). The perceived
emotional harm to the child as a basis for disallowing recovery lacks credibility in cases where
the parents are unmarried and the action is based on fraud and deceit. In such cases, it is unlikely
that the child will be unaware of the animosity between the parents or the circumstances
surrounding his or her conception. This legal fiction of happy parenting and joyful birth is not
grounded in the reality of the situation. It is, however, consistent in its focus on the interest of the
child and the child's welfare as predominant. This policy is probably best reflected by the
adamant statement in Moorman v. Walker that the court "simply will not collaborate in conduct
that disparages an innocent child." Id. But see Taber, supra note 6, at 419 (stating "[i]f a child
can handle the distress of discovering in the course of a suit against a physician that her parents

1082

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

These reasons, perhaps colored by the parental support obligation
mandated by the state, led courts to refuse as a matter of policy to
permit those expenses to be shifted even when the harm resulted from
the actions of a third party. 18 7 The court in C.A.M. v. R.A.W.
commented on the inequity of permitting parents to shift the expenses of
child rearing to a third party, while retaining all of the benefits:
Every child's smile, every bond of love and affection, every reason for
parental pride in a child's achievements, every contribution by the
child to the welfare and well-being of the family and parents, is to
remain with the mother and father.... On the other hand, every
financial cost or detriment-what the complaint terms "hard money
damages" including the cost of food, clothing and education, would be
shifted to the physician who allegedly failed to timely diagnose the
188
fact of pregnancy.
C.A.M. also raised the troubling question of the extent to which
mitigation of damages principles would be applicable to claims alleging
misrepresentations involving contraception or fertility. 189 The court
commented that mitigation principles were equally applicable in tort, as
well as contract, actions and that one defense in an action by one parent
against the other might be the failure to abort:
We recognize there are a variety of reasons why a woman may decide
not to undergo an abortion. However, we question whether a plaintiff
in a tort action for the wrongful birth of a normal, healthy child may
decide to have the child and then look to defendant for damages. 190
The potential that such a defense might be viable buttressed the court's
19 1
conclusion that public policy precluded claims of this sort.
To the extent that recovery has been permitted, it has historically
been limited to those damages immediately related to the expenses of
childbirth. 19' In Smith v. Gore, 19 3 for example, a medical malpractice
action against a physician for a failed tubal ligation, the plaintiff also
did not intend her to be born, she can also manage the same information when the suit is brought

by her mother against her father").
187. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 617 nn.1-2 (N.M. 1991) (listing the
jurisdictions and a few of the corresponding cases that refuse to shift liability).
188. C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 561 n.8 (citing P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)).
189. Id. at 562-63.
190. Id. at 562.
191. Id. at 563.
192. See, e.g., id.at 563 (analyzing the limited costs courts should consider for damages);
Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 411 (R.I. 1997) (discussing different measures of
damages for birth of healthy child as a result of negligent sterilization and treatment by other
jurisdictions).
193. Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 740, 751 (Tenn. 1987).
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sought to recover expenses associated with raising the child, in addition
to damages for emotional distress and the expenses of childbirth. The
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court ruling limiting
recoverable damages to those immediately related to the pregnancy and
The court found that existing child support statutes
birth. 194
demonstrated that the state placed the obligation for support upon the
parents and that the parents could not shift this obligation to a third
party: "Significant and far-reaching questions of social policy are
involved, 'and it is the prerogative of the General Assembly to declare
' 195 Looking at
the policy of the State touching on the general welfare."'
plaintiff's claim as an ordinary tort claim sounding in negligence the
to establish
court held that as a matter of policy, plaintiff was unable
expenses. 196
child-rearing
for
causation
legal,
or
proximate,
This stance may be shifting. In Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez,
a medical malpractice case alleging negligent sterilization, the court
held that there were two harms suffered by the plaintiffs due to the
physician's negligence. 197 First, Mrs. Mendez remained fertile and
second, the couple's desire to limit their family size-and associated
financial burden-was frustrated. 198 After concluding that the plaintiffs
had suffered harm within the restatement definition, the court then
questioned whether it was "legally compensable-i.e., an injury, an
19 9
Citing the Second
invasion of a legally protected interest?"
Restatement of Torts, the court noted:
Both, to be
Harm, like injury, is not necessarily actionable.
actionable, must be legally caused by the tortious conduct of another.
In addition, harm, which is merely personal loss or detriment, gives
rise to a cause of action only when it results from200the invasion of a
legally protected interest, which is to say an injury.
Thus, the Lovelace court easily found that Mrs. Mendez's personal
interest in her physical condition as well as the couple's interest in
protected
financial security and economic stability were
20 1 legally
interests, the invasion of which was compensable.
194. Id. at 751-52.
195. Id. at 751.
196. Id.
197. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 610 (N.M. 1991).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 610 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 7 cmt. a, b, d (1965)).
201. Id. at 611; see also Bums v. Hanson, 734 A.2d 964, 974 (Conn. 1998) (finding plaintiffs
claims of harm from defendant's negligence compensable); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d
243, 246 (Wis. 1990) (discussing the damages requested by plaintiffs); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d
883, 886 (Conn. 1982) (holding that plaintiffs medical expenses qualified as damages).
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The Lovelace court also found that the defendant's negligence had

compromised the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected right to decide
whether and when to procreate. 2 02 The court agreed with the finding by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Ochs v. Borrelli,20 3 also a negligent
sterilization case, that to preclude recovery for all damages caused by a
tortfeasor, including ordinary costs of child rearing, would improperly
burden the exercise of a constitutionally protected right to "employ
contraceptive techniques to limit the size of [one's] family." 204 The
court in Lovelace, however, expressed concern about how to measure
damages from the invasion of this interest beyond those already
reflected in the economic costs associated with child birth and rearing,
and recast the inquiry as to what other additional damages were
20 5

available for injuries of this type.

The Lovelace court obviously struggled with the prevailing concept
that the plaintiffs could have suffered no damages in light of the birth of
a healthy child. Over the past twenty years, courts have embraced this
struggle and have begun to question the characterization of "harm" in
wrongful birth cases, arguing that there is a distinction between an

"injury," which is the invasion of a legally protected interest, and
20 6
"harm," which is the loss or detriment as a result of that injury.

Jurisdictions following this path are still in the minority; most
jurisdictions continue to adhere to the "no recovery" rule for the
ordinary expenses of rearing a healthy child.20 7 Indeed the New
Mexico court in Wallis refused to extend Lovelace to misrepresentation
202. Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 613.
203. Ochs,445 A.2d at 885.
204. Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 612 (quoting Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885). The Connecticut court
clarified Ochs in Burns v. Hanson, explaining that although Ochs involved a claim for damages
associated with rearing a disabled child, the rule adopted in Ochs applied equally in cases where
the defendant's negligence resulted in the birth of a healthy child. Burns, 734 A.2d at 968-70.
205. Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 613.
206. See Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 609 (discussing damages). That court stated:
Given that a tort has occurred (the doctor's negligence in performing the sterilization
operation and failing to inform the mother of the unsuccessful outcome) and given that
an injury has resulted from this tort (the mother's continued fertility, despite her desire
and effort to be sterilized), what is the measure of damages to compensate her for the
injury she has suffered?
Id.
207. See Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 617 & n.1 (listing jurisdictions which adhere to the "no
recovery" rule but noting that many of the decisions cited "include strong dissents from one or
more judges criticizing the rationale of the majority and urging the adoption of a different rule").
Judge Alarid, writing for the appellate court and whose opinion was reproduced in the Appendix
in Lovelace, also listed jurisdictions where some recovery was allowed for child-rearing expenses
but with an offset for the emotional benefits of parenthood. Id. at 617 n. 1. Judge Alarid also lists
jurisdictions with dissents who urge the adoption of the offsets rule. Id. at 617 n.2.

2005]

In Search of Paternal Equity

1085

of fertility claims, distinguishing Lovelace on the basis that it did not
involve inter-parental liability but the fault of a third party: "Therefore,
Lovelace does not implicate the public policy of individual
and liability illustrated in the UPA and our child support
responsibility
20 8
statutes."
Lovelace does, however, indicate that the view that the birth of a
child is a benefit that will always outweigh any inconvenience in family
circumstances is beginning to erode. This departure from damages
related to the immediate expenses of childbirth 209 signals a commonsense exception and an implicit acknowledgement that rules created to
ensure the financial well being of a child and meant to govern the
behavior of the immediate participants are not transferable to an
independent third party. Certainly, the argument that the damage
question has been miscast is equally relevant in misrepresentation of
fertility cases. Whether the claim sounds in negligence or fraud, the
interest invaded is virtually identical to the interest invaded in negligent
sterilization cases. It may also include an interest in informed consent
similar to that found in the sexual disease cases and premised upon the
trust implicit in intimate relations-that there will be full disclosure of
disease or status prior to engaging in sexual activity.
c. The damage dilemma (Part II)-beyond child support
The issue of damages is broader, however, than simply the ordinary
expenses of childbearing or support obligations. Such a limited focus
wholly ignores non-support related damages. Setting aside whether
support obligations can or should be avoidable, damages in
misrepresentation of fertility cases include allegations of emotional
trauma resulting from the betrayal of trust and subsequent role of
unwilling parent-to-be. 2 1° Emotional distress can result from the
208. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
209. The birth of a deformed or unhealthy child, however, can sustain a claim for childrearing and extraordinary medical care. See Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 351 (Nev.
1995) (deeming it reasonably foreseeable for a mother of a deformed child to experience
emotional distress for the rest of the child's life). Many state statutes provide for recovery of
expenses related to pregnancy and childbirth in filiation proceedings against the putative father.
See Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (determining the

purpose of a filiation proceeding).
210. Indeed, the Court in Roe v. Wade identified a litany of "harms" that a pregnant woman
might suffer as a result of pregnancy beyond the physical impact of her condition. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by childcare. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
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uncertainty of parental status pending termination of a pregnancy
through miscarriage or abortion, the related parenting obligations
foisted upon the victimized party beyond the support obligations or the

various social censures that may accompany unwed parenthood.2 1'

Notably, when the defrauded party is a woman, these emotional costs

may become compensable damage items as do other expenses related to

the physical toll of pregnancy and/or abortion-damages considered
personal to her. 2 12 The court in Alice D. held that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover those damages that would return her to the same
position she would have been in if she were not pregnant. 2 13 The court
awarded damages that included the cost of the abortion and
accompanying transportation expenses as well as lost wages and, more

significantly, the pain and suffering she claimed resulted from having

become pregnant and then having an abortion. 2 14
If her distress was attributable to her emotional upset from the
pregnancy and abortion, and not from external causes, damages
therefor [sic] may be awarded.
I believe that she suffered
considerably as a result of facing the trauma of an unwanted
pregnancy. Emotional distress is clearly a foreseeable and proximate
consequence of an unwanted pregnancy that has been aborted. 2 15
Courts have not, however, accorded men similar emotions.2 1 6
When couched as an issue of child support, the judicial stance

unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
Id.
211. See, e.g., Welzenbach v. Powers, 660 A.2d 1133, 1134 (N.H. 1995) (stating that plaintiff
sought, in addition to support costs, the cost of paternity blood tests, "medical expenses
connected with psychiatric care and medicines, as well as damages for emotional distress"). Note
that even in wrongful birth cases permitting recovery for the child-rearing costs, courts are
unlikely to permit recovery for the emotional burdens of parenthood. See, e.g., Jones v.
Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (Md. 1984) (holding that in an action for a negligent sterilization
that results in a healthy childbirth, damages for child-raising costs to the age of majority can be
recovered, but should potentially be offset by emotional benefits the parents have received).
212. As discussed below, emotional and physical damages are recoverable only in cases by
women for paternal misrepresentations. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 n.10
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (determining that men and women can be treated differently, because they
are not similarly situated in terms of the risk of pregnancy).
213. Alice D., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
214. Id. at 356-57.
215. Id. at 357. Although the plaintiff also sought to recover for physical changes and
therapist visits allegedly connected to her pregnancy, the court found that her failure to submit
adequate proof precluded any damages on those items suggesting that upon sufficient proof an
award would have been appropriate. Id.
216. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(refusing to bring the court into such a private matter); Jose F. v. Pat M, 586 N.Y.S.2d 734, 73536 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding that permitting a biological father's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress went against public policy).
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denying recovery in misrepresentation of fertility claims is at least
facially gender neutral.2 1 7 To the extent that the wronged party seeks to

recover for monies paid in child support, whether asserted directly or
indirectly, the courts have consistently denied relief regardless of the
gender of the claimant. 2 18 Where damages sought are non-supportrelated, the asserted basis for differential treatment between maternal
and paternal misrepresentations with respect to the element of damages

turns solely on the characterization of the actual condition of pregnancy
as synonymous with "physical harm," whether the woman miscarries,
aborts or carries to term. 2 19 In Alice D., for example, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's misrepresentation that he was sterile

resulted in her becoming pregnant and having an abortion. 220 With
little discussion, the court made the following finding: "Under the facts
in this case, it would be incredible and intolerable to state that a woman
who becomes pregnant against her wishes and then aborts, has not been
harmed. I hold that she has." 2 2 1 Obviously, under this reasoning, since

only women can become pregnant, only women can suffer the harm
requisite to maintain a claim and therefore only women would have any

right to recover.222 The father is liable for the expenses of
pregnancy, 223 including the cost of abortion, as well as for a pregnancy

217. See, e.g., C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(holding that a woman alleging misrepresentation of fertility could not recover costs of child
support from the father); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
denial of claim for misrepresentation of fertility "is gender neutral insofar as it precludes
monetary reimbursement for child support").
218. The California court, in the unpublished decision of Tharp v. Black, denied recovery to
the mother for the costs of support associated with the birth and rearing of a healthy child, making
no distinction in treatment between such claims whether brought by the mother or the father.
Tharp v. Black, No. C036767, 2001 WL 1380406, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2001).
219. Admittedly, allowing allegations of physical harm to outweigh privacy interests is not
unusual. As noted earlier, courts have frequently cast aside the right to privacy that might
otherwise have shielded sexual conduct in the face of alleged threats to health, safety and welfare.
See supra Part H (analyzing a woman's right to privacy in matters of procreation).
220. Alice D., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 352. In Alice D., the defendant told the plaintiff that he was
sterile due to a medical condition called hydrocele although in fact, this condition does not cause
sterility. Id.
221. Id. at 356. The BarbaraA. court similarly permitted the plaintiff's claim to proceed on
the basis that the plaintiff suffered an ectopic pregnancy after relying upon the defendant's
misrepresentation of sterility before having unprotected sexual intercourse. Barbara A. v. John
G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
222. Under this rationale, the gender bias or distinction is at least plausible albeit still
uncomfortable. It is at least consistent with the underlying assumptions of the abortion cases and
the gender disparities that exist within jurisprudence.
223. In many instances child support statutes provide for recovery of the expenses of
childbirth.
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22 4
that may be abnormal owing to no fault of his own.
However, subsumed within the "physical harm" adopted by the court
in Alice D. is the incurrence of emotional and economic harm as well,
all of which the woman becomes entitled to seek recovery for.22 5 At
that point, the plausibility of any gender distinction (to the extent that it
is accepted as a plausible and therefore legitimate distinction) fails,
because both the pregnant mother and the putative father can experience
emotional and economic harm arising from the pregnancy. 2 26 Indeed,
Donald Hubin, discussing some of the emotional accoutrements of
paternity, noted that impending fatherhood caused some men to
experience symptoms that mimicked pregnancy. 22 7 Upon recognition
that harm is not limited to just the economic costs of support, these
"other" costs, including emotional costs, lost wages or transportation
costs, theoretically should be compensable regardless of gender. When
the plaintiff is a man, however, the assumption in the case law is that
these harms are derivative-they stem from the birth of the child and
therefore form part of the bundle of joys that a child is presumed to
bring. The claim is perceived as one for "wrongful birth" and the focus

224. No "fault" means that the woman's unique physical characteristics create an ectopic or
other condition in which the fetus cannot survive as opposed to any participatory culpability in
conception.
225. See Alice D., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (allowing a woman to recover economic losses
incurred due to abortion).
226. To the extent the emotional harm suffered by the woman is limited to distress directly
related to the physical discomfort of pregnancy or abortion, then a valid distinction may still
exist. In such cases, awarding damages for that narrow subset of emotional harm remains
consistent with existing rationales that equate pregnancy with physical harm.
227. Hubin, supra note 59, at 38. Hubin writes:
Men's concerns with their children and their status as a father often begin before the
birth of the child. A surprising number of expectant fathers, "especially those who are
involved in committed relationships" with the mothers, experience couvade syndrome.
This set of symptoms mimics, in some ways, the experiences of pregnancy. Estimates
of the frequency of couvade syndrome vary from 11% to 65% of expectant fathers.
Id.
Other scholars have made similar observations about the emotional condition of men during
pregnancy. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of Paternal
Bonding in the Law of Family Relations, 33 IND. L. REV. 691, 692 (2000) ("In nearly all societies
a significant percent of men display pregnancy-like symptoms when their mates are expecting a
child-weight gain, nausea, irritability, indigestion, and so on."); Forman, supra note 68, at 992.
Professor Forman comments on the rise in fathers seeking custody of their children, and observes
that interest in parenting is prevalent even among teenage fathers, noting that "[s]tudies reveal
that the majority of teen fathers remain involved with their partners ... [and] express interest in
assuming parenting responsibility, and most plan to provide support and care for their children."
Id. at 993. Pointing to studies that looked at the negative emotional fallout experienced by unwed
fathers involved in adoption proceedings, Forman posits that these studies suggest that for some
men, parenting is a significant event and denial of the opportunity to parent "represents a
profound loss .
I..."
Id.
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shifts from the maternal tortfeasor to the reality of a child and
concentrates solely on the parental obligation of support, effectively

nullifying the very real anger, hostility, resentment and emotional
distress that the defrauded father may experience.

Accordingly, to

maintain the fagade of legitimate gender bias, an even finer line must be
drawn between the type of emotional harm suffered by the father as a

result of the "knowledge" of the state of pregnancy and the presumably
very different-and compensable-emotional harm suffered by the

woman as a result of the "experience" of pregnancy. In reality, any
such distinction is illusory, yet the judicial decisions make no effort to
explain the inconsistency in application between maternal and paternal
misrepresentation claims beyond reference to physical harm.
4. Privacy Rights and Public Policy
Cases addressing paternal claims of misrepresentation of fertility or

contraceptive use also emphasize privacy rights as precluding judicial
interference. These decisions reflect an unwillingness to delve into the
relationships. 228

social interaction and discourse attendant to intimate
Consistent with the position taken in the heartbalm cases, courts shroud

the conversations, persuasions, and interchange of emotions, words, and
conduct that occur in the course of relationships within a protected and
expected zone of privacy. 229 The courts were disinclined to become

involved in the feelings and nuances involved in romantic relations,
considering this course either "unseeml[y]" as noted by the judge in

Askew v. Askew, 23 or as simply presenting an impossible task of
attempting to discern truths amid the persuasions and not technically
false communications accompanying the constant shifts in power that

may occur over the course of a single discussion.

The California

228. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(claiming that the state has minimal interest in the private matter of a woman misrepresenting her
use of birth control to a husband, who did not want a child); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 685
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an individual's choice of whether or not to use contraceptives
falls into a zone of privacy that courts should not enter); C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 558
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (noting that courts have long recognized a right of privacy in
matters relating to marriage, family and sex).
229. Professor Larson comments that privacy in the context of intimate relations is an
oxymoron as the desire to be alone, yet with someone, means that there is no true privacy. See
Larson, supra note 97, at 441-42. This protected zone includes the marital relationship,
recognized in decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The extension of
the right of privacy to protect contraceptive decisions outside the marital relationship necessarily
recognized some privacy rights attendant to nonmarital sexual relationships despite the fact that
many states criminalized fornication and adulterous relationships.
230. Askew v. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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appellate court in Stephen K. v. Roni L.231 took just such a stand, noting

that:
Despite its legalism, [plaintiffs misrepresentation claim] is nothing
more than asking the court to supervise the promises made between
two consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual

conduct. To do so would encourage unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to privacy. 232
The court acknowledged that the defendant mother may have lied to

the plaintiff and "betrayed the personal confidence reposed in her," but
nonetheless concluded "the circumstances and the highly intimate
nature of the relationship wherein the false representations may have
occurred are such that the court should not define any standard of

conduct therefor[e]." ,233 Thus, concerns about violating the traditional
right to privacy in procreative choice factor into privacy discussions,

albeit playing a secondary role. 234 This right protects the autonomous
individual as an entity distinct from the sexual unit and considers the
protected privacy right to include the right to determine when, how and
whether to procreate without unwarranted government-and therefore

judicial-intrusion. By extension, any conduct that is an integral part of
the procreative decision would be protected from judicial scrutiny.
Policy rationales articulated by the courts to deny paternal
misrepresentation of fertility claims ultimately prove to be
unsatisfactory. Judicial refuge in the alleged privacy of the sexual
2 35
conduct itself has been roundly criticized as hypocritical at best.

231.

Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

232. Id. at 620.

233. Id. In another case, the California court followed similar reasoning in rejecting a claim
for fraudulent breach of promise to impregnate in Perry v. Atkinson, expressing its concern over
utilizing tort law to remedy what it perceived as purely private affairs of the heart. Perry v.
Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (Cal. Ct. App.. 1987).
The courts should not undertake the adjudication of promises and representations made
by consenting adults regarding their sexual relationships. Once we attempt to
determine in court, by means of tort law, the bona fides of promises such as are alleged
here, we will of necessity be required to set standards for the making and performing of
such promises.
Id.; see also Tharp v. Black, No. C036767, 2001 WL 1380406, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2001)
(finding that the case would be governed by Stephen K.and the reasoning of BarbaraA.).
234. See, e.g., Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21 (holding that the misrepresentation of
birth control is a private matter merely representing a broken promise between two consenting
adults).
235. See, e.g., Murray & Winslet, supra note 9, at 793-94 (stating that if consensual,
heterosexual conduct is granted constitutional privacy, there must be a "remedy to the injured
party in these encounters where consent is lacking"); Rudolph, supra note 9, at 338-39 (claiming
that the state is attempting to regulate beyond its police power in areas where there is no public
interest).
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Most note that the government frequently intrudes into private matters,
2 3 6 The
depending upon the particular state interest being advanced.
right to privacy has not been held inviolate and may be abrogated upon
a showing of compelling state interest, with legislation permitting
intrusion into private sexual conduct upheld in both civil and criminal
contexts. 2 37 Both the legislatures and the courts have sought to regulate
23
As noted
personal sexual preferences between consenting partners.
details
intimate
the
into
inquiry
sanctioned
have
also
courts
the
above,
of a
transmission
the
redress
to
of sexual encounters where relevant
sexually transmitted disease and have demonstrated little hesitation at
diving into private sexual conduct where the woman alleges that
239
in physical harm.
misrepresentations of fertility by the man resulted
Those courts have expressed little concern that an inquiry into private
of conduct
sexual conduct would risk a judicially mandated standard 240
Yet, by
against which all intimate relationships would be measured.
forthrightness
and
honesty
of
lack
for
penalty
a
of
imposition
definition,
within the confines of intimacy establishes a willingness to impose upon
236. Murray and Winslet note:
[I]f the court intervened on behalf of the defrauded party in the Stephen K situation, it
would not deprive the offender of her personal choice regarding use of contraception.
Thus the court would not deprive the offender of her constitutional right to privacy.
Judicial intervention would simply prevent her from using fraud in the exercise of such
a choice.
Murray & Winslet, supra note 9, at 793.
237. See Rudolph, supra note 9, at 342 ("This inconsistency makes no sense since the public
policy which protects an individual from harm is applicable in both the criminal and civil
contexts.").
238. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend constitutional
protection to homosexual conduct, even though it took place between consenting adults),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme
Court refused to extend constitutional protection to homosexual conduct even thought it took
place between consenting adults. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93. In reaching its holding, the Court
noted that there had long been proscriptions in the law against consensual sodomy at common
law and at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified by the original thirteen states. Id. "In fact, until
1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today 24 States and the District of Columbia continue
at 193. It was not until the recent decision in Lawrence v.
Id.L.."
to provide criminal penalties ..
Texas that the Court overruled Bowers. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In Lawrence, the Court
acknowledged, among other things, that the condemnation of homosexual conduct "has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family." Id. at 571. The Court held its mandate to define liberty, not impose its own
moral view, and found private sexual conduct between consenting adults fell within a protected
right of privacy, whether that conduct involved homosexual or heterosexual behaviors. Id. at
578-79.
239. As with the sexual disease cases, bedroom antics and protestations are no longer too
"private" when confronted with the state interest in health, safety and welfare triggered by
allegations of physical harm.
240. The courts have addressed the general right of privacy and held that it gave way to the
government's overriding interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
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society as a whole the obligation to order behavior accordingly when
acting within the sphere of the romantic unit.
Finally, reliance upon the privacy of the decision to use or not to use
contraceptives as a basis for denying relief for misrepresentation of
fertility claims, upheld against government intrusion in Eisenstadt and
Griswold,is misplaced. The issue presented by the misrepresentation of

fertility cases is not the election by the man or woman to conceive; it is
the fraud perpetuated on an unsuspecting partner in order to achieve

conception. Refusal to accord relief to the victimized partner through
tort law effectively condones the intentional disregard by one partner of
the procreative rights-the right not to conceive-of the other. 24 1
Neither Eisenstadt nor Griswold nor any of the abortion decisions
suggests that exercise of a right protected under the privacy umbrella
shields the actor from any and all misfeasance that implicates that right.
Although the state may not interfere in the decision to conceive, or
place obstacles in the path of conception, fraud remains tortious when
used to facilitate the exercise of an otherwise protected constitutional
right. 242 Once again, the state interest in protecting the safety and
welfare of its citizens is both strong enough, and the interference
minimal enough, that fraud should not be wrapped in a cocoon of

constitutional right.
IV.

THE IMMUNIZATION OF MATERNAL TORTS

The unarticulated premise running through judicial-and much of the
academic-discussion surrounding paternal rights and obligations is
that paternity is a voluntary state rendering imposition of the attendant
moral, social and financial consequences just. 243 No weight or
241. But see Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223, 228 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) ("[The right of
privacy does not] encompass[] the right of one parent to avoid a child support obligation where
the other parent's choice regarding procreation is not fully respected.").
242. Consent--or lack therof-is also relevant. For example, consent to sexual conduct does
not extend to consent to contract a sexually transmissible disease. Similarly consent to sexual
conduct does not extend to consent to parent (absent acceptance of the assumption of the risk
theories discussed infra). In both scenarios, the risk of "harm" is present. Without an affirmative
misrepresentation or omission there is no fraud, and at best a claim for negligence. Murray and
Winslet argue that:
Courts have not applied the right to privacy to prevent a state from protecting the rights
of a victim of a coerced or nonvoluntary sexual act. If the constitutional right to
privacy is extended to protect consensual, heterosexual encounters, the right must not
foreclose a remedy to the injured party in those encounters where consent is lacking.
Murray & Winslet, supra note 9, at 794.
243. See Totz, supra note 3, at 141 (arguing that the existence of presumptions surrounding
sexual conduct depending upon marital state). Totz suggests that there may be procreative
presumptions as to the intent to or not to procreate, which create implied contracts:
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consideration is given to whether the putative father in fact sought to
procreate 244 or whether representations may have been made, and relied
upon, as to fertility or contraceptive use. 24 5 The act of sexual

intercourse with a woman carries with it a risk of pregnancy and the
implicit assumption, clearly premised on theories of tort law, is that by
engaging in consensual intercourse, whether protected or unprotected, a
man can be held to have voluntarily consented to pregnancy or at
minimum to have assumed the risk of such an outcome should it in fact
occur. 246

Under this traditional theory of liability, responsibility is

Utilizing the above presumed intentions, a man would be fiscally responsible for a
On the other
child when it is presumed that the man desired to beget the child ....
hand, a man should not be fiscally responsible to provide child support if he was single
and the conception was unintended or the result of a birth control mishap--one of the
main rationales for a woman's abortion right.
Id at 153. If an unmarried woman became pregnant and bore the child, she would be breaching a
presumed agreement not to procreate and would not be entitled to damages. Id at 153-54. Totz
asserts that she may also have a duty to mitigate, one option of which being abortion. Id. at 154.
244. In fact, state judicial decisions have held that the father's constitutional right to procreate
was limited to the preclusion of governmental interference into decisions related to contraceptive
use. See, e.g., L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the
constitutional right to decide whether to father a child does not encompass the right to avoid child
support obligations because the mother misrepresented use of a contraceptive); Inez M. v. Nathan
G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (holding that the father failed to prove
misrepresentation as to use of contraceptive or precautions or deception); Linda D., 687 P.2d at
227 (holding that a father's right to make choices regarding procreation is not limited by refusing
to allow him to claim a right to avoid child support obligations).
245. See, e.g., Beard v. Skipper, 451 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that a
mother's alleged misrepresentation as to contraceptive protection could not be used as a
mitigating fact when computing the father's contributions towards child support); Weinberg v.
Omar E., 482 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that statutes impose obligation
to support regardless of circumstances surrounding conception including the age of the father);
Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 624 (Pa. 1983) (saying that the mother's alleged deceit is not a
valid counterclaim or defense in paternity suit); Linda D., 687 P.2d at 226-27 (holding that
mother's alleged conduct does not affect father's child support obligations). Cases that said that a
misrepresentation defense was not appropriate or cognizable, or was irrelevant to paternity
proceeding note that the primary purpose of paternity proceeding is to protect the child's welfare
and that obligations are statutory requirements. Also, courts that addressed the support issue are
of limited jurisdiction. See Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) ("To allow one parent to utilize a plenary action to deflect the statutory obligation onto the
other would render" child support statutes nugatory and would "jeopardize the welfare of the
child by reducing the financial means of the parent found to be at fault."); Smith v. Price, 328
S.E.2d 811, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that one cannot raise a counterclaim based on a
misrepresentation defense in paternity or support actions because the law imposed an obligation
to support and the child had right to support).
246. See, e.g., Dorsey v. English, 390 A.2d 1133, 1138 (Md. 1978) (holding that the father, by
having sex with the mother, risked her pregnancy and rejecting the argument that the mother's
refusal to abort broke causal relationship); Inez M., 451 N.Y.S.2d at 612 (noting that the
plaintiff's assumption that just because the woman viewed motherhood as incompatible with her
career plans did not mean she was "guarantor against the natural consequences of the parties'
intimacies"). Note, however, that imposition of absolute liability for support obligations has even
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easily assigned and the imposition of costs attendant to that outcome-a
child-is fair. 247 The father cannot be heard to complain because the
risk became a reality.

Although current constitutional doctrine does

afford a man an "out" for an unwanted pregnancy, should the woman
choose to abort, this "out" is without his control or input, and should she
248
choose to bear the child, his liability is strict.
In theory, at least, this tort concept presumably would also extend to
a woman who engaged in consensual intercourse. 2 49 Because of the

woman's unique position and equal (to the man) understanding of the
risks, the burdens of pregnancy would be equally foreseeable and
parenthood voluntarily assumed.2 5 ° Arguably, the "choice" afforded
been imposed on fathers who were victims of statutory rape, County of San Luis Obispo v.
Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), as well as sperm donors, Ferguson v.
McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353 (Ct. Com. Pleas 2002). See also Kate Sutherland, From
Jailbirdto Jailbait:Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313 (2003) (exploring the state's presence in the realm of teenage
sexuality). In People v. Sorenson, the California Supreme Court affirmed the misdemeanor
conviction of a man for failure to pay child support, noting "[a] reasonable man who.., actively
participates and consents to his wife's artificial insemination... knows that such behavior carries
with it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood and criminal responsibility for nonsupport." People
v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968).
247. But see Karen Czapanskiy, supra note 55, at 1416 (arguing that paternal rights have
expanded while maternal rights have decreased).
248. See, e.g., Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative Father's Right to
Terminate His Interests in and Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 26 (1998)
(arguing that if courts will not permit putative fathers to rely on the woman's representations
regarding birth control, they are creating a "strict liability standard for any unmarried male
engaging in sex ....
"). Interestingly, feminist scholars have argued that fatherhood is a choice.
See, e.g., Czapanskiy, supra note 55, at 1418 (stating that no mandatory duty has developed with
respect to the familial or personal relationship between father and child while the mother has no
choice). See also In re S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Colo. 1982) (pointing out that statutes create
an irrebutable presumption between conception and child birth).
249. Obviously all conduct carries with it certain risks. Walking down the sidewalk risks
being hit by a car or knocked over by a scooter. Admittedly, assumption of the risk implies some
negligence on the part of one or both parties. But unprotected consensual sex is the equivalent of
walking not on the sidewalk but in the middle of the street. See also Alice D. v. William M., 450
N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982). ("While it is true that the alternative methods of birth
control which the claimant would have used had she not relied upon the defendant's
misrepresentation are not one hundred percent effective, these methods are far superior to sexual
intercourse without the use of any contraception. Therefore the remote chance the pregnancy
might have resulted in any event is not sufficient to deny the claimant recovery.").
250. Andrea M. Sharrin, supra note 54, at 1401 (quoting Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1017 (1984), as stating that "all women of childbearing
age know that pregnancy may violently alter their lives at any time"). The high costs of
pregnancy include a substantial physical and emotional toll, directly borne by the woman and
implicating her right to be free from unwanted physical intrusion. A number of commentators, as
well as the Supreme Court, have commented on the "burdens" of pregnancy. But see Alec
Walen, supra note 31, at 1054 (discussing perceived problems with the application of an
assumption of the risk argument to women and framing it as whether a woman "assumes the risk
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under Roe would be rendered moot, since the woman would be deemed
251

sex.
already to have "chosen" to be pregnant by having consensual

The rights of the fetus would attach at conception and she would have
252 This theory
no greater right than would he to avoid the outcome.

drastically simplifies any inquiry into procreative conduct to "was there
consensual sex?" Parental obligations attach immediately upon an
affirmative response. In reality, however, even the suggestion that a
woman has agreed to pregnancy by virtue of agreeing to engage in

sexual intercourse generates significant controversy, with the Supreme
Court decisions on abortion clearly rejecting that position.253 Under the
abortion decisions, implicit in the procreative rights of the woman,
unlike the man, is that pregnancy must be consciously and affirmatively
consented to, at least until the point of viability. 54 At that point,
consent is presumed, although the presumption is rebuttable under
limited circumstances. 25 5 Whether couched in terms of when the

woman's right to privacy can be overcome by state interest or the extent
of a woman's right to control her body, fundamentally it is a question of

of carriage").
251. Under such an analysis, as a practical matter, Roe would be meaningless to any woman
who was not the victim of rape.
252. This is essentially a fetal right premised upon the existence of a duty owed by the mother
to the fetus by virtue of the pregnancy, at least to the extent it arises from consensual sex.
Although solidly grounded in tort law, it not surprisingly has found little support among
advocates of abortion rights. See, e.g., Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1569 (1979) (discussing the duty to aid as well as the Good Samaritan rule in the context of fetal
versus maternal rights); Walen, supra note 31, at 1054 (arguing that abortion advocates can
defend the practice on moral grounds, even if it is accepted that the fetus is a person).
253. Commentators, raising various objections, have also argued against an assumption of the
risk argument. Professor Walen, for example, in exploring the viability of an assumption of the
risk argument, questioned whether simply because pregnancy might occur meant that a woman
assumed the risk of carriage by engaging in consensual intercourse. Walen, supra note 31, at
1051. Walen contends that it does not and further explores the woman as Good Samaritan in
determining whether pregnancy creates even a moral obligation given the undue burden of
carriage. Id.
254. See Peter D. Feaver et al., Sex As Contract:Abortion and Expanded Choice, 4 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 211, 212 (1992-93) (stating that, under Roe, the "fetus is legally 'alive' only when
the mother makes the choice to carry the fetus past the viability hurdle"). Feaver argues that child
support laws assume life begins at coitus, at least for purposes of holding the father responsible.
Id. at 213. This presumption is in conflict with Roe's refusal to accord "life" to the fetus at coitus
but rather at the woman's decisional point. Id.
255. Once the fetus has reached viability, the state interest in protecting the potentiality of life
becomes compelling and state regulation is permissible subject to the health of the mother. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a
requirement that abortions after twelve weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital);
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983) (requiring second-trimester abortions to be
performed in licensed clinics).
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25 6

consent.
In part, the discomfort with this gender disparity may be whether the
law should, as it does in Roe, carve an exception which permits a

woman, but not a man, to discard any obligations that might arise out of
consensual sex that results in pregnancy, and not only presume that a
woman has not "chosen," but indeed that she cannot be required to
choose, until viability. 257 Scholarship is replete with articles debating
the legal, moral and religious merits of a woman's constitutional right to
258

choose.

More significantly, however, at the same time that it

256. The expressed justification underlying the argument in favor of abortion rights and
rejecting paternal input is that because women, and only women, can get pregnant; women, and
thus only women, get to decide when to abort. There is substantial merit to this view. Some have
cast the fetus as the equivalent of a tumor or foreign body that the woman should be able to refuse
to carry and deny the sustenance that only she necessarily can provide. This fetus as an
"attacker" premise is also used to counter arguments that a woman owes a duty of care to
the
fetus that would supersede her right to abort. Recent action by states to assign personhood status
to a fetus and permit actions against not only third parties but also the mother for harm to the
fetus have kept the debate over the extent of a woman's obligation to the fetus in the forefront. A
recent example involves the charges brought by the state of Utah against a woman who allegedly
refused to agree to a recommended Caesarian until it was too late to save one of the twins she was
carrying. See Matt Canham, Proposed Law Targets Pregnant Drug Users, THE SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 10, 2004, at Al (discussing proposed Utah law that would make abusing a fetus a
crime, thus targeting drug-abusing pregnant women); Sarah Childress, Justice: A New
Controversy in the Fetal-Rights Wars, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004 (giving a brief overview of the
controversy surrounding laws that hold mothers liable for injury to the fetus).
257. See, e.g., In re S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting a father's effort to avoid
child support on the basis that that Uniform Parentage Act denied him Equal Protection where
mother refused his offer to pay for an abortion).
258. See Sarah E. Hurst, A One Way Street to Unconstitutionality: The "Choose Life"
Specialty License Plate, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 957 (2003) (arguing that state statutes, which allow
motorists to purchase "Choose Life" license plates and gives proceeds to groups such as Catholic
charities, violate establishment and free speech clauses of First Amendment); Charles I. Lugosi,
Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America: A Moral Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to
the Unborn From Creation to NaturalDeath, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (2004) (contending that it
is immoral and unjust to classify the unborn as "separate and unequal" and that the unborn should
be given constitutional protection); Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the
ConstitutionalRight to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057 (1999) (arguing that if a woman
does not consent to pregnancy, she can use deadly force to stop the harms to her that the fetus
causes); Sharrin, supra note 54 (arguing that a woman's right to an abortion should be upheld
over challenges of fathers-to-be seeking to enjoin abortion); David M. Smolin, Commentary,
Abortion Legislation After Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Model Statutes and
Commentaries, 20 CUMB. L. REV. 71 (1989-90) (proposing model statutes to restrict abortions in
light of the decision in Webster); Karen E. Walther, Partial-BirthAbortion: Should Moral
Judgment Prevail Over Medical Judgment?, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 693 (2000) (outlining various
courts' rationales concerning partial birth abortions and arguing that outlawing the procedure is
an undue burden to women seeking abortions); David J. Zampa, Note, The Supreme Court's
Abortion Jurisprudence: Will the Supreme Court Pass the "Albatross" Back to the States?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 731 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court can lessen conflict with the
states by adopting Justice O'Connor's "unduly burdensome" standard, which abandons the per se
strict scrutiny standard when analyzing state restrictions on abortion).
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provides a pregnant woman with a choice-and an option-Roe and its
progeny also serve to insulate a woman from at least some of the
consequences of her procreative conduct that might otherwise have been
redressable in tort. Instead, a woman has no liability in tort or otherwise

for her post-conception decision to bear or not to bear a child. Current
law unequivocally subsumes the rights of the fetus to exist to those of

the woman and no action in tort can be brought in the name of the

259 paternal
fetus-or the father-in an effort to supersede those rights;
lawsuits seeking damages for that "choice" rightly have foundered
under constitutional scrutiny. 2 60 The affirmative assertion in cases such
as Farley v. Sartin26 1 that by definition a woman who chooses abortion
cannot be a tortfeasor stands cloaked in the certainty that a
constitutional right that carries with it a penalty for its exercise is
illusory. 2 62 Indeed, in Maher v. Roe, the Court noted: "A woman has at
least an equal right to choose to carry the fetus to term as to choose to
'263 Accordingly, a woman cannot be held any more liable for
abort it."
to abort. 264
the act of carrying a child to term than she can for choosing
Claims arising out of misrepresentations of fertility do not directly
implicate a woman's right to choose. 26 5 The issue is not whether a

259. See, e.g., In re S.P.B., 651 P.2d at 1214 (rejecting the argument that plaintiffs equal
protection fights were violated by imposing a statutory duty of child support where the mother
declined plaintiff's offer to pay for an abortion). The Supreme Court decision in Casey, however,
has placed some limits on those rights and has been viewed as eroding Roe. Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-98 (1992).
260. See also Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Cl4. Ct. App. 1987) ("Tort liability
cannot apply to the choice, however motivated, of whether to conceive or bear a child.").
261. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that the term "person" in
wrongful death statutes incompasses nonviable unborn child).
262. See Morris v. Frudenfeld, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that "in a
case of 'wrongful birth' ... a mother ...cannot be required, under the legal doctrine that a
plaintiff take reasonable measures to mitigate damages, to undergo an abortion"); Hughes v. Hutt,
455 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1983) (holding that to penalize a decision not to abort could result in
women deciding to abort in order to avoid liability, an outcome contrary to professed state
interest).
263. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
264. In Perry v. Atkinson, the court noted that "[allthough Atkinson may have deliberately
misrepresented his intentions to Perry in order to persuade her to have the abortion, their
procreative decisions were so intensely private that we decline to intervene. Tort liability cannot
apply to the choice, however motivated, of whether to conceive or bear a child." Perry, 240 Cal.
Rptr. at 405.
265. Some argument exists that imposing liability for misrepresentations of fertility could
raise an obligation to mitigate or otherwise induce a woman to choose abortion to avoid or
minimize damages. See e.g., C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (stating that attempting to correct some of these wrongs may do more social damage than
good); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223, 228 (1984) (noting that no right encompasses the right
of a parent to avoid child support obligations when the other parent's choice regarding
procreation is not fully respected); Payne, supra note 175, § 10 (providing examples of
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woman should have liability in tort for exercising her right to an
abortion; rather, the issue is the extent of procreative conduct that is or
even should be immunized by that right and protected from liability,
whether implicitly or explicitly. 266 Recent cases in the area of fetal
rights suggest that, at minimum, the historical deference accorded to

women in their choice of behavior while pregnant is eroding. 267 Some
of these limits are already being tested both in civil and criminal
courts. 2 68 What is becoming clear is that upon exercising her choice to
constitutional considerations in various jurisdictions concerning refusal to abort on paternity or
support proceedings).
266. But see Stacie L. Lude, After Farley v. Sartin: The Consequences of Declaring a

Nonviable Fetus A "Person "for the Purpose of Wrongful Death, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 339, 347-48
(1996) (suggesting that Farley opens the door to suits against mothers for tortious abortion).
267. It may be that this erosion was precipitated by the abortion debate and the subsequent
focus by states and anti-abortion advocates on according personhood status to a fetus, thereby
opening the door not only for criminal liability but for civil tort liability as well. State statutes
seeking to impose criminal liability upon women who use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol while
pregnant are increasing in number. See, e.g., Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 466 (N.H. 1992)
(holding that a child born alive has a cause of action against his or her mother, who negligently
crossed the street and was hit by a car while pregnant); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that a child had a cause of action against his mother for damages
to his health, allegedly resulting from use of medication during pregnancy); see also Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.01-48.347 et. seq. (West, 2003) (including the Children's Code, which protects the
unborn children of expectant mothers); S.D. CODtFIED LAWS §§ 34-20A-63 to 70 (Michie 1998)
(providing for involuntary commitment to emergency medical treatment center if threatening
physical harm to herself or another); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75
(2001) (holding that it was an illegal search and seizure to report urine tests positive for drugs to
police when taken while mother is giving birth); Doretta Massardo Mcginnis, Comment,
Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 505 (1990) (arguing that the criminal justice system is not suited to intervene in the
medical and sociological problems associated with drug use and pregnancy). Some courts have
upheld negligence claims by children against their mothers for harms occurring while in the
womb. But see Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (declining to permit cause of
action by fetus against mother for negligence and remanding a grant of summary judgment
allowing suit against mother for taking harmful medication during pregnancy to proceed).
268. Recent decisions have found little reason to distinguish between the negligence of third
parties resulting in fetal harm and the negligence of the mother, despite the slippery slide toward
maternal servitude. See In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S. 2d 366, 371 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998)
(showing of harm caused by mother's continued use of cocaine allowed court to find neglect and
issue protective order for unborn child); In re J.G., No. 21944, 2004 WL 1103971, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 19, 2004) (noting mother's parental rights terminated after continued drug use while
pregnant); State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 174 (S.C. 2003) (upholding twenty year sentance
for injesting cocaine while pregnant); Perez v. Tex. Dept. of Protective Custody & Regulatory
Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. App. 2004) (discussing situation in which parental rights for all
children tenrninated after mother became pregnant again and refused drug treatment); State ex rel.
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Wisc. 1997) (reversing an order to place mother
in detention under order to take unborn child into custody to protect child from mother's drug
use, but reversing only after the child was born). But see Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E. 2d 260,
267 (Mass. 2004) (noting that a mother did not owe a duty of care to her unborn fetus in
negligence action brought by child to recover for injuries suffered in automobile accident); State
v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W. 2d 490, 496 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an unborn child was
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bear the child, the pregnant woman-once inviolate in her pregnancyto order her behavior as she chooses without regard to
loses the freedom
269
fetal rights.
Of concern when considering the propriety of misrepresentation of
fertility claims is the de facto presumption of impunity that seems to

exist at the other end of the procreative spectrum; that the woman may
be insulated from liability for any conduct, even where tortious, in the
course of conceiving a child as long as that conduct does not present a
threat to health, safety and welfare.2 70 In one respect, the abortion
debate is irrelevant to this issue; the right protected by the abortion
decisions is the right to choose to abort a fetus regardless of how the
is made not to abort, Roe
fetus was conceived. Once the choice
27 1
cases.
most
in
meaningless
becomes
However, implicit in the application of the abortion decisions and
built on the foundation of Griswold and Baird, is that from conception

through viability there is a legal (and moral) vacuum where some
inchoate right to exist remains in limbo pending the woman's

conclusion that the reality of pregnancy should be embraced.
Depending upon the form of the debate, whether it advocates abortion
not a "human being" for purpose of first degree homicide charge so mother could not be charged
although she delivered child with blood alcohol concentration over thirty percent). In Bonte, the
New Hampshire court held that a pregnant women owed a duty of reasonable care to her fetus
stating, "[w]hile we recognize that the relationship between mother and fetus is unique, we are
not persuaded that based upon this relationship, a mother's duty to her fetus should not be legally
recognized." Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466. The court disagreed with the dissent that the imposition of
such a duty would unduly impair the privacy and personal autonomy rights of the mother,
opening up day-to-day decisions and activities to judicial scrutiny. Id.
269. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 450 (1983) (discussing limits placed on a woman's feedom
to control her body during pregnancy). Robertson notes:
[When a woman] chooses to carry the child to term, she acquires obligations to assure
its well-being. These obligations may require her to avoid work, recreation, and
medical care choices that are hazardous to the fetus. They also obligate her to preserve
her health for the fetus' sake or even allow established therapies to be performed on an
affected fetus.
Id.
270. Clearly as to some tortious conduct accompanying sexual relations, e.g. transmission of a
sexually transmitted disease, any immunity is immediately abrogated. The courts have had little
difficulty imposing liability on either partner in such circumstances with privacy rights easily
sublimated almost as a matter of course to the state interest in health, safety and welfare.
Conception, if it occurs, is a throwaway at best and a non-issue in the press by the victimized
partner for redress. As to other conduct, such as intentional (or even negligent) misrepresentation
of fertility or use of birth control, conception represents the point at which harm accrues and the
claim matures.
271. There are, of course, cases where late term abortions may be considered and, in those
cases, the rights accorded under Roe and its progeny are resurrected, although the balancing
equation may have changed.
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rights or procreative rights, conception itself is simply either the point at
which the potentiality comes into existence-triggering the running of
the abortion clock-or a vehicle for elaboration on fundamental rights
of privacy. 272 In either form, however, conception is cloaked with the
presumptive exercise by the woman of a protected right immune from
challenge under the umbrella of the privacy decisions and the looming
shadow of Roe triggered by the state of pregnancy. For her, at least, the
protection from liability in tort vis-ez-vis the father seems to extend
through pregnancy with her actions becoming virtually unassailable
upon actually bearing a child. Concomitantly, no immunity, de facto or
otherwise, attaches to the man's conduct even though it too occurred in
the course of conceiving a child. In short, while the decision to
conceive or not to conceive may be a fundamental right protected from
unreasonable governmental intrusion and the method of conception
similarly shielded, these protections are effectively one-sided with no
real protection accorded to the father's procreative choice.
The basis for any determination of tort claim viability, however,
should be the legal wrong committed (for which redress is available)
and the harm caused by that wrong. Short of legislative expression or
substantial public policy to the contrary, presumably, our system of
justice provides a remedy for such civil wrongs. A corollary premise,
however, is that not every wrong rises to the level of a legal wrong
entitled to protection and by extension, compensation. 27 3 In tort law,
particularly, goals of compensation and deterrence intersect to protect
274
against the unreasonable interference of the interest of others.
However, it is the breadth of the concept of what constitutes a tort that
leads to an inability to adequately define its parameters-i.e., the basis
upon which the unreasonable invasion of an interest, resulting in harm,
275
is deemed not simply a wrong, but a legal wrong and, hence, a tort.
272. In Roe, the Court stated that embryological data and new medical techniques at the time
"purport to indicate that conception is a 'process' over time, rather than an event .... " Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973); see also Misner, supra note 3, at 286-89 (discussing fetal rights
and conception with respect to preembryos).
273. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that the husband's claim for fraud and emotional distress against the man who had an adulterous
affair with the plaintiff's wife and was the actual father of two children born to the marriage, was
not a wrong that should be redressable in tort). The court noted:
It does not lie within the power of any judicial system, however to remedy all human
wrongs. There are many wrongs which in themselves are flagrant. For instance, such
wrongs as betrayal, brutal words, and heartless disregard of the feelings of others are
beyond any effective legal remedy and any practical administration of the law.
Id. at 249.
274. PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 99, at § 1.
275. See id. §§1-5 and accompanying notes (discussing the difficulty in defining torts).
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Indeed as noted by Dean Prosser,
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its
development are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's
interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
the claim is novel will not of itself
defendant, the mere fact that2 76
operate as a bar to the remedy.
In both the recognition of interests previously unrecognized and the
rejection of existing claims, the evolution of social mores plays a role.
Similarly, legislation reining in exercises of judicial power that fail to
recognize the new moral environment or, alternatively, have pushed
beyond the bounds of existing moral comfort also impacts the
availability of a remedy. In short, notions of public policy grounded in
judicial economy and constrained by often-antiquated social constructs
law, regardless of whether that
determine the outer bounds of tort
2 77
boundary is justified in reality.
Thus, the difficult task of considering the appropriate judicial stance
in misrepresentation-of-fertility cases is essentially an identification of
what policy in reality underlies the inherent unwillingness to permit
such a claim to go forward, and whether the boundary imposed by the
courts precluding relief is warranted in light of that policy. The primary
rationales for denying relief-current dependence upon child support,
privacy concerns or the sufficiency of damages, either alone or in
combination-fail to quiet the underlying sense of discomfort threading
through decisions that deny recovery for tortious conduct that would be
redressable in other circumstances. 2 78 This discomfort is exacerbated
by the willingness of some courts to afford relief to deceived mothers.
To some extent, efforts to overcome the inadequacies of a given
rationale by buttressing denial of relief on several different public
policy arguments simply serves to cast suspicion upon the conclusion
279
Consequently, decisions rebuffing
that relief should be denied. 27
276. Id. §4. Conversely, no clarity is afforded circumstances under which conduct previously
deemed tortious is deprived of its tortious character and no longer compensable. Id.
277. There are a number of decisions where "public policy" is touted as virtually dictating a
certain outcome. In some instances, the policy adhered to has been advanced by the legislature
through statutes or other pronouncements. In others, the courts have applied judicial perceptions
of what is fair or right or just. See, e.g., Welzenbach v. Powers, 660 A.2d 1133 (N.H. 1995)

(relying on public policy in barring actions of a father who was married to another woman at the
time of the alleged intentional misrepresentation).
278. The exception may be those cases where the courts have firmly and with little discussion
concluded that there could be no justifiable reliance.
279. These flaws are exacerbated even further by the difference in treatment accorded to
women who allege misrepresentations by the putative father. Although courts have relied on the
existence of child support statutes or the "unseemliness" of inquiring into intimate relationships
to deny recovery for paternal claims of misrepresentation of fertility, these same policies have not

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1102

[Vol. 36

paternal misrepresentation of fertility claims seem to reflect an
uncertainty or confusion as to the framework within which these claims
should be analyzed. 280 The result is a decided lack of coherence as the
courts struggle to articulate a reasoned approach.
V.

THE IMPACT OF THE RIGHT TO PROCREATION IN TORT?

(OR MAKE LOVE NOT WAR)

This article contends that judicial reluctance to afford relief for
claims arising out of misrepresentations of fertility should rest squarely
in the right to procreate and the obligations accompanying the resulting
parent-child relationship.
The articulated concerns about privacy,
"harm," or support obligations flow from this duality but do not drive it.
A slight shift in perspective exposes procreative rights as the real center
of any inquiry into the viability of such a claim and the foundation upon
which the parties' respective rights and obligations should be assessed.
The distinction is subtle but significant.
The procreative decision has been held and consistently reaffirmed as
grounded in a social need to reproduce in order to perpetuate the species
and maintain the social order. 28 1 In addition to being a basic instinct,
the right to procreate is considered an inherent right that "fulfills
cultural norms and individual goals about a good or fulfilled life, and

many consider it the most important thing a person does with his or her
life."2 8 2

Supreme Court decisions on privacy acknowledge

the

precluded recovery by a woman for misrepresentations made by a man. The implication is that,
as to the woman, not only are the circumstances surrounding conception immune to challenge,
but she is entitled to redress for the physical discomforts and emotional burdens presumably
suffered where conception was not freely risked. The argument that compensation for the
physical discomfort experienced by the woman as a result of the deceit is persuasive and is
certainly supportable under the reasoning in the sexual disease cases.
280. See generally Rudolph, supra note 9 (arguing that courts use outmoded concepts of
gender roles by treating males and females differently in misrepresentation of fertility cases).
281. Robertson, supra note 269, at 408 ("Reproduction is a basic instinct that supplies
societies with the members who maintain and perpetuate the social order and who provide
services for others. Reproduction also satisfies an individual's natural drive for sex and his or her
continuity with nature and future generations."). But see Hiester, supra note 4, at 233
(contending that "[a]lthough the very existence of the child might be deemed procreation, it is not
until the law recognizes or enforces parental rights or obligations that procreation is realized").
282. Robertson, supra note 269, at 408. See GILBERT MEILENDER, BIOETHICS, A PRIMER
FOR CHRISTIANS 25 (1996) (asserting that "it is a task undertaken at God's command for the
sustaining of human life"); EARNEST W. PAGE, M.D. ET AL., HUMAN REPRODUCTION, THE CORE
CONTENT OF OBSTETRICS, GYNECOLOGY AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 73 (1972) ("Human
reproduction is almost wholely a byproduct of human sexuality. Sexual drives, responses,
customs and mores determine... the structure of society as well as the rate of growth and the
composition of our populations."); Aristotle, On the Relationship of Parentsand Children, in THE
ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 132, 133-34 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992) ("[F]or
any living thing that has reached its normal development ... the most natural act is the
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significance of procreation to society, and society's paramount

responsibility to ensure its continued existence. 2 83 The state, as the
embodiment of society, assumes the role of protector both of the right to
reproduction of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as
far as its nature allows, it may partake of the eternal and the divine."); Charles J. Reid, The
History of the Family, in THE FAMILY 12 (Lisa Sowell Cahill & Dietmar Mieth eds., 1995)
(noting that St Augustine (in his treatise "De bono comiugali" or "On the Good of Marriage")
proposed that Christian marriage exists to serve the goals of fidelity, symbolic stability, and
procreation); see also Eileen K. Fry-Bowers, Controversy and Consequence in California:
Choosing Between Childrenand the Constitution, 25 WHITIER L. REV. 889 (2004) (suggesting a
multi-layered approach to the presence of sex offenders in California); Hiester, supra note 4, at
213-14 (positing that child-support laws and welfare regulations creating an automatic obligation
to pay child support upon establishment of paternity deprive men of their fundamental right to
procreate, violating the Equal Protection and Due Process rights); Carole M. Hirsch, When the
War on Poverty Became the War on Poor, Pregnant Women: Political Rhetoric, The
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, and the Family Cap Restriction, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 335 (2002) (analyzing the rights of pregnant women as they apply to the poor); H.
B. Hodge, Prisonerof Love: Incarcerationas Contraceptiveor Should Lifers Beget Life? Gerber
v. Hickman, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 947 (2004) (outlining the various opinions of the Ninth
Circuit in the context of fundamental rights of prisoners to procreate); Amanda Mechell Holliday,
Who's Your Daddy (and Mommy)? Creating Certainty for Texas Couples Entering Into
Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1101 (2003) (analyzing the desirability of surrogacy
contracts in Texas and proposing the type of legislation Texas should consider adopting); Lisa
Jarvis, Should the International Olympic Committee Be Policing Motherhood? Constitutional
Implications of Regulating Pregnancyand the Abortion-Doping Scheme Under Domestic Law, 13
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 297 (2003) (contending that while proposed hypothetical regulations
may not survive constitutional scrutiny, they may at least have a positive moral and ethical
impact); Richard M. Lebovitz, The Accordian of the Thirteenth Amendment: Quasi-Personsand
the Right of Self-Interest, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561 (2002) (outlining the history of the
Thirteenth Amendment and looking at it in light of recent questions of what it means to be a
person as a human embryo); Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of
Posthumously Concieved Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1067 (2003) (examining and critiquing
society's response to the needs of posthumously conceived children); Sara D. Petersen,
Comment, Dealing With CryopreservedEmbryos Upon Divorce: A ContractualApproach Aimed
at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065 (2003) (proposing that courts should
draw on contract law principles to determine whether the parties to conflicts actually reached
agreements regarding embryo disposition in the event of divorce); John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7
(2004) (analyzing six situations of harm to offspring that are of current policy concern); Kelly R.
Skaff, Pay Up or Zip Up: Giving Up the Right to Procreateas a Condition of Probation,23 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 399 (2004) (arguing that making probation conditional on a promise not
to procreate is constitutionally permissible and a valuable alternative to prison); Amber Stine,
Note, The Implications of the Due Process Clause on the Future of Human Embryonic Gene
Therapy, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 507 (2003) (concluding that constitutional challenges to the practice
of gene therapy are likely to fail in cases where it is used for therapeutic purposes to correct
genetic abnormalities); Roger H. Taylor, The Fearof Drawing the Line at Cloning, 9 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 379 (2003) (analyzing the importance of the emotional response to cloning and
scientific implications of both cloning and human development); Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P.
Kahn, Using PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guideline
& Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327 (2003) (discussing the issues presented in pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis);.
283. See supra Part I (discussing the right to privacy in the wake of Roe v. Wade).
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procreate and of the children conceived pursuant to the exercise of that
right.2 84 Marriage, as a state-sanctioned institution, facilitated the
concept of a nuclear family and functioned as the foundation and

structure for this society's ability to perpetuate itself according to
established norms and perceived morality. 28 5 As one commentator
points out, "the fundamental purposes of the marital relation itself were
procreation and the rearing of children. The 'natural' duration of that
relation was the time required for the 'continuation of the species-that

is, the time it took to prepare children to care for themselves.'

286

And,

although the state acknowledged the right to procreate outside of

marriage, societal stigmas and penalties encouraged individuals to
exercise their right within the confines of marriage and raise their
children under an umbrella of common goals and aspirations surrounded
by the protective cocoon of "family." 28T Indeed, the Supreme Court has
284. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("A democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies.").
285. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that marriage
is a "basic civil right[]"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (claiming that marriage is
the "foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress"). In some societies, the obligation is communal-all members are responsible for
the nurture and care of the children of the community.
See, e.g., Linda L. McClain,
"Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996) (evaluating the rhetoric of
irresponsible reproduction and analyzing why certain choices and behaviors are deemed
irresponsible).
286. Mark E. Brandon, Essay, Family at the Birth of American ConstitionalOrder, 77 TEX. L.
REv. 1195, 1204 (1999). Professor Brandon, looking at the constitutional status of the family and
its role in a changing political landscape, notes that under John Locke's thesis, the purpose of the
family was to ensure an environment whereby children were introduced to behavior conditioned
by the law through the "exercise of reason." Id.
287. See, e.g., Jennifer Jaff, Essay, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of UnmarriedPeople in
American Law, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 207 (discussing bias in the law against unmarried persons and
contending that the notion of "traditional" family should be discarded). The importance of the
family in the United States, which protected it from unwanted governmental intrusions, has not
afforded the same level of protection for illegitimate chidren:
Historically, both the English common law and society itself perceived illegitimate
children to be a disgrace, a stigma, and labeled this class with the title of 'bastards.'
Through no fault of his own, the bastard was a social outcast. The bastard was a
product of an illicit, immoral, and promiscuous relationship. Because the child was not
conceived within the legal constraints of marriage, the child could not enjoy the legal
rights, liberties, and benefits of a child who was in fact conceived with the bond of
marriage. The right of an illigimate child to inherit was nonexistent.... This status
continued in the common law and was eventually carried over to the United States.
Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1311-12 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1988). Society essentially
deemed the illegitimate child a child of no one. Id. at 1312. However, the Supreme Court has
increasingly reversed the common law's discriminatory treatment of such children by according
them greater constitutional protections. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (stating
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long emphasized the role of family in society, recognizing that the
family's role in the care and management of children serves an
important societal interest. 288 It is at the family level that values are
learned, mores and customs are observed, and laws ordering individual

and community behavior are reinforced to facilitate cohesiveness in
what, in effect, is a community effort to build society as a whole.
Recent shifts in traditional social constructs regarding family and
marriage, 2 89 as well as changing sexual mores, have led to increasing

judicial scrutiny of parent-child relationships in order to ensure that the
290

disintegrates.
interests of the child are protected even if the "family"
Regardless of whether the case involves marital or non-marital
provided for.2 9 1
intimacy, the state seeks to ensure that any children are
that "illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons"'); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (holding that the mother of an illegitmate child was denied equal protection
when the state denied relief in a wrongful death action because the child was illegitimate).
Ultimately, the Court began using an intermediate standard of review for cases involving
illegitimacy. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (laying out special provisions for
surviving illegitimate children under the Social Security Act); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976) (extending presumption of dependence to illegitimate children under certain conditions for
purposes of the Social Security Act); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (holding that
certain disability benefits unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause by
discriminating against certain children based on the status of birth); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973) (establishing that a state cannot discriminate against illegitimate children by denying
them substantial benefits that are generally accorded to legitimate children).
288. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (noting that the child's welfare
depended on strengthening family ties whenever possible); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (holding that Equal Protection was violated by the sex-based distinction between
unmarried mothers and fathers when blocking adoption).
289. See, e.g., Dolgin, The Family in Transition, supra note 25, at 1534; Janet L. Dolgin,
Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentationof the Ideology of the Family, 32
CONN. L. REv. 523, (2000) (reviewing the legal deliniations of paternity and maternity, which
ignore contemporary understandings of the biological facts of kinship).
290. See, e.g., L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that equitable
principles demand that both a mother and her lesbian partner are responsible for the child's
needs); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the
intended parents of a surrogate mother's child were treated in law as natural parents and the
husband was obligated to pay child support); Richard P. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (relying on public policy to hold that the husband was not entitled to
maintain action against wife who had two children by another man during their marriage);
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976) (remanding case to examine the best interest of
the child because of prolonged separation of mother from child, lack of a household, and her
unwed status); Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966) (awarding sixty-year-old
grandparents permanent custody because of the likelihood of seriously disrupting and disturbing
effect on child).
291. See, e.g., Jo Michelle Beld & Len Biernat, Federal Intent For State Child Support
Guidelines: Income Shares, Cost Shares, And The Realities Of Shared Parenting,37 FAM. L. Q.
165 (2003) (discussing the impact of federal shield support guidelines on the economic
circumstances of children of separated parents); Laurie Madziar, Comment, State v. Oakley: How
Much Further Will The Courts Go In Trying To Enforce Child Support?, 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
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The state interest is twofold; characterized as a welfare interest, focused
on what is best for the child as well as a vested (albeit secondary)
interest in establishing a legally enforceable support mechanism to
preclude the necessity of tapping state coffers through public welfare
systems. 2 92 The determination of the child's best interests plays a
predominant role in the approach of both courts and legislatures towards
issues of paternity, child support, custody, adoption and myriad other
matters that impact or involve children, with the law clearly placing an
absolute premium on protecting the child once it is born. 293 The
imposition of a non-delegable obligation to support a child is grounded
in this fundamental premise, and society has logically assigned this
responsibility to the parents first. In this respect, the obligation is a
social obligation owed by the individual for the good of the whole. Its
moral basis stems from the genetic relationship between parent and
child and the moral responsibility that attaches to a life for which one is
held responsible for creating. 294 In both instances, the moral obligation
is guided by a primary sense of personal responsibility freely
recognized and respected.

REP. 65 (2002) (addressing the potential impact of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision that
upheld probation condition that restricted the defendant's right to procreate); John J. Sampson &
Barry J. Brooks, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (2001) with Prefatory Note and
Comments (with Still More UnofficialAnnotations), 36 FAM L. Q. 329 (2002) (outlining the Act's
general provisions); Richard F. Storrow, ParenthoodBy Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HAST. L.J. 597 (2002) (pointing out that
surrogacy and artificial insemination now provide fertile grounds for redefinition of "family").
292. State enforcement efforts intensified with the increase in the divorce rate and
proliferation of single-parent (typically women) households in an effort to defray the costs
associated with the additional children added to welfare programs. See, e.g., Santillo, supra note
57, at 509 (discussing portions of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act that requires states to increase
funds to improve effectiveness of child support). In Pamela P. v. Frank S., the family court
commented that an "ancient and enduring interest.., is parental support for helpless children...
with State care only as a last resort." Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 347 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1981), rev'd462 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (N.Y. 1983).
293. See, e.g., supra Part II (analyzing the socioeconomic effect of fatherhood). See also
Bennet v. Jeffreys, 256 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976) (finding best interests of child superior to
right of parental custody); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293,
302-04 (1988) (articulating rights-based standard of parental responsibility and contrasting it
with the best interests of the child standard).
294. See, e.g., Krause v. Krause, 206 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Wis. 1973) ("This court has
consistently held that a father's duty to support his minor children rests upon not only moral law
but legally upon the voluntary status of parenthood which the father assumed."). But see Nancy
E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 132 (2003) (arguing that fatherhood should not be defined either by marriage or
by genetics, but should be defined by "nurture" focusing on the emotional as well as physical care
of and relationship with the child). It is analogous to the moral duty of due care owed by a
mother to an unborn fetus, prescribing her conduct during pregnancy to afford the fetus an
optimum environment for growth.
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As a consequence, society acknowledges and the law recognizes that
parents have a unique privity with the child and that the uniqueness of
this relationship can override otherwise prevailing laws or theories of
29
Prior to
recovery. 295 Absent this relationship, no duty exists.
child is
the
owed
attaining the age of majority, the obligation
which
at
paramount. Once the child achieves majority-the point
society has determined the child is no longer in need of parental
protection-the duty disappears. However, law has always been a
statement not of what man-and by extension society-is, but a
statement of what man aspires to be. The collective reluctance to
interfere in procreative conduct is a tacit acknowledgement of the
significance of that conduct to societal interests and aspirations, and
more importantly, to its continued existence. The Court has easily
rebuffed state encroachment under the auspices of privacy, despite the
297
At the same time,
lack of explicit constitutional authorization.
a remedy is to
sanction
to
that
acknowledges
also
protecting procreation
with it the
carries
that
undermine the privity between parent and child
298 This privitychild.
that
obligation to nurture, support and protect
and the resulting obligation-is joint; it is shared by both parents and
owed by both to the child. A denial of that privity propels society
towards an uncertain future and further erodes existing self-protections,
jeopardizing the fundamental state interest in the maintenance of the
social order.
Viewed in this light, the refusal of courts to permit recovery for
claims of misrepresentation of fertility can be viewed as twofold. First,
it is a recognition that any action that penalizes procreation-to the
extent that claim is brought by one parent against the other-conflicts
with society's fundamental purpose and is by definition subject to veto.
Second, it reflects an unwillingness in light of the joint privity of the
parents with the child to sanction claims between them that undermine
the resources, tangible and intangible, otherwise available for the child's
care and support, even though in any other circumstance and by any
295. For example, tort law permits a stranger to walk by a drowning child but imposes a duty

to act upon the parent. PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 99, § 56, at 374-76. The laws of

intestacy distribute first to the children of the deceased before distributing to more remote
relations and include a negative presumption against disinheritance. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE
(1987) (outlining laws governing disposition of property upon death). Intra-family immunities
are reflective of the protections afforded the family relationship.
296. See PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 99, §56, at 374-76 (discussing the concepts of
"misfeasance" and "nonfeasance").
297. See, e.g., supra Part II (analyzing the socioeconomic impact of fatherhood).
298. See PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 99, § 122, at 904-10 (discussing torts in the family,
particularly between parent and child).
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other person or entity the claim might be validly stated. This latter
conclusion rests on the amorphous "whole" of resources that would be
available through the age of majority, whether currently obligated or
not. Nor is it limited to economic resources but includes the emotional
resources necessary to adequately nurture the child's emotional health
2 99
and well-being.
Once the issue is framed as a question on the inherence of procreative
rights, the protectionist policies that surround procreation and any
resulting children easily provide an appropriate platform upon which to
deny recovery in tort and are defensible without regard to gender or
shifts in traditional notions of family and relationships;
acknowledgement of the ascendancy of procreative rights and its
corollary preempting redress for otherwise tortuous conduct is gender
neutral. By definition, procreation becomes non-tortious and the
immunity implicitly extended to the woman in existing fraudulent
conception cases necessarily extends to the man as well. Concomitant
with this analysis is the recognition that there is no justification for
differentiation between maternal or paternal misrepresentations of
fertility, and thus the claim simply is not cognizable as to either,
regardless of how damages are cast. 30
To some extent such a
conclusion hints at a reincarnation of the assumption of risk theories
staunchly rejected in pro-choice rhetoric, extending strict liability to the
woman as well as the man. Under the construct of procreative rights
suggested above, however, the scope of risk assumed by sexual
intercourse that results in conception focuses not on the right to choose
abortion, but on the inability of one party to assert claims against the
other that are incompatible with those explicated rights. Within this
framework, rights of privacy or child support obligations play a
secondary and supportive rather than starring role. Judicial recognition
of the core premise of procreative rights, protected by society through
concepts of privacy or parental support, creates a sound threshold for
denial of relief free from the criticisms that current opinions engender
and the sense of uncertainty they suggest.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are instances where the interplay between responsibility for the
consequences of one's actions and the innate desire to trust those with
299. Whether or not the parents choose to expend those resources on the child is irrelevant.
What is protected is the availability of the pool of resources to the parent.
300. This does not suggest an obligation to mitigate, or pretense that abortion itself does not
carry emotional loads or physical intrusion. Clearly it does.
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whom we are intimate-even if only for a moment-seems to achieve a
Admittedly, the rejection of a claim for
state of parity.
misrepresentation of fertility or contraceptive use removes one of the
constraints governing trust and honesty in sexual relationships and
threatens to disrupt the underlying premise that each party implicitly
understands and agrees to the articulated boundaries of their interaction.
The result may be a shift in balance towards simply assigning personal
responsibility for types of conduct that impact procreative choice. To
some extent, the inquiry comes full circle to rest at the feet of Griswold
and Eisenstadt. The conclusion that the right to procreate inures in the
individual imposes not simply a right to choose when and how to
procreate, but perhaps a nondelegable obligation to protect against
unwanted procreation. 30 1 Complaints that procreative choice was
impaired by the conduct of others are eliminated. At minimum it
relieves courts of the effort to shoehorn procreative conduct into
traditional tort theory and the morass of state statutory authority that
attempts to codify human sexual behavior into a system of financial and
moral obligations.

301. In essence, this is the theory behind cases that concluded that there could be no justifiable
reliance.

